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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation:           Risk-based Approach to Maritime Safety 
 
Degree:                                                           MSc 
 
This dissertation is a methodological study of the risk-based approach to safety and 
its application to maritime industry. 
 
The concept of safety and risk is defined and discussed as well as their relationships. 
The traditional approach to safety is examined including its limitations, the 
advantages and necessity of the risk-based approach to safety is identified. The 
general procedure of the risk-based approach is presented, and the major limitation: 
the uncertainty associated with the risk-based approach is analysed.  
 
Various techniques of risk-based approach are presented and investigated with 
regard to their advantages and disadvantages, and a comprehensive examination of 
the characteristics of these techniques is made for the purpose of paving the way for 
choosing appropriate techniques in the application to maritime safety.  
 
The characteristics of maritime industry are investigated as well as their implications 
to the application. Two methodological issues in the practical application, adaptation 
of the general procedure and selection of suitable techniques, are examined. In 
order to show how the risk-based approach will be applied to maritime safety in 
depth, a model case of risk assessment of a generic ship is presented, which 
illustrates how a combination of techniques should be applied in practice.  An ideal 
scheme of application is presented in order to show at macro level how the risk-
based approach may be applied to the maritime industry. 
 
The current situation is examined and the future development of the risk-based 
approach in maritime safety is discussed. Several major recommendations are 
made concerning the future promotion of the risk-based approach. 
KEYWORDS: Maritime, Safety, Risk, Approach, Assessment 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
 
Shipping is an old industry and from the very beginning safety has been major 
concern of this industry. Throughout history people have been continuously 
exploring new techniques to improving efficiency of shipping industry as well as 
safety performance in order to meet the intense competition and growing demand 
for safety from the society. Nowadays a whole set of approaches to safety have 
been developed through accumulation of hard work of safety practitioners over the 
years, and such traditional approaches have contributed greatly to maritime safety 
and marine environmental protection. However drawbacks more easily draw the 
attention of the society. The traditional approach is blamed as “passive” instead of 
“active”, and the maritime industry is blamed as “slow to change” to improve its 
safety performance. The only chance of change seems to be the occurrence of 
catastrophic accidents. Nevertheless society expects actions to be taken before the 
occurrence of such accidents and prevent the occurrence of them. Facing such 
growing pressure for a more effective safety approach, the so-called “risk-based 
approach” to safety was introduced under intense discussion and debate as a 
defence against such criticism. 
 
1.2. Purpose and incentive 
 
The risk-based approach originated from the nuclear industry, but later saw wider 
application in other sectors like chemistry, aviation, offshore and proved to be 
effective and efficient in enhancing safety performance. The application of the risk-
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based approach to maritime safety is still at the initial stage of development, to most 
of the people in the maritime industry except those risk experts and analysts, the 
knowledge of the risk-based approach is quite new and remote. Some people could 
not accept the idea of this approach, one reason might be the lack of understanding; 
some people simply stay away from it and do not go into this area because, they 
think, this approach is so difficult and complicated a subject that it is only for experts, 
not for them. Even people, who want to explore this approach, have difficulty in 
finding suitable materials or guidance to start with, because the information and 
materials on this approach are scattered in many areas. It is very difficult to find a 
comprehensive material that systematically introduces and discusses the risk-based 
approach to maritime safety. Knowledge therefore becomes a major obstacle for the 
promotion of the application of the risk-based approach to maritime safety. The 
purpose of this dissertation is to help alleviate this problem by providing a 
systematic discussion of the risk-based approach from the basic concept, procedure 
and various techniques, to the application of it to maritime safety. In fact, this 
dissertation aims to construct a comprehensive framework or picture of the risk-
based approach to maritime safety, which is very necessary and important for 
people to understand, especially at the initial stage of development. Therefore this 
dissertation can as well serve as a guideline on the risk-based approach to maritime 
safety at a broad level.  
 
1.3. Objectives 
 
The main objectives of this dissertation are the following: 
 
• Define the concept of safety and risk as well as their relationship 
• Identify the necessity of the risk-based approach to safety 
• Summarize the general procedure of the risk-based approach and analyse 
the uncertainty associated with it 
• Examine the advantages and disadvantages of various techniques of the 
risk-based approach  
• Identify the characteristics of maritime industry and their implications to the 
application of the risk-based approach 
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• Examine the practical procedure of the application and the principles of 
choosing suitable techniques 
• Present a model case of risk assessment of a generic ship, and an ideal 
scheme of the application of the risk-based approach to the maritime 
industry at macro level 
 
1.4. Methodology and limitations 
 
Literature research is the major method of research of this dissertation. Various 
resources are utilized, such as WMU library and its partner libraries, Internet 
resources, materials collected from IMO, UK Maritime Coast Guard Agency (MCA) 
during field trips, materials from Lund University, and so on. Resources from non-
maritime industries are widely used for the research on the general methodology. As 
previously mentioned, materials on the risk-based approach is widely scattered, and 
since the application of the risk-based approach to maritime safety is only at the 
initial stage, relevant materials, especially those with maritime background, are very 
difficult to be located, therefore the process of material collection is quite tough and 
time consuming. 
 
This research is a study focusing on the methodology at a broad level. It is 
constrained by the nature of the topic and therefore not allowed to go into details of 
certain specific methods, which is the limitation of this research. Another limitation 
comes from the author’s background, also because the application of the risk-based 
approach is at the initial stage, only a few experts have certain practical experiences, 
most of people, including the author, do not have such experiences. The author tries 
to compensate for this limitation by more extended literature research on practical 
cases of application and the record of expert discussions.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Risk-based approach to safety 
 
As the basis of this dissertation, this chapter will introduce and discuss the basic 
concepts of safety and risk as well as their relationship. The traditional approach to 
safety and the present situation of maritime safety will be examined, and then the 
risk-based approach will be introduced and examined with the aim of identifying its 
advantages and necessity to maritime safety. 
 
2.1. Safety and risk 
 
2.1.1. The interpretation of safety 
 
Safety is a popular topic that is deeply concerned by the whole human world. The 
term safety is discussed widespread under different contexts, from different 
perspectives; accordingly, it has various interpretations. Therefore, before going 
further to the relation between safety and risk, it is essential to examine the meaning 
of the term “safety” and have an accurate understanding of safety. 
 
Typical examples of the general definition of safety are: 
“Freedom from danger” (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 20), and 
“freedom from unacceptable risks/personal harm” (Kuo, 1998 attributed to Fido and 
Wood, 1989). 
 
These different definitions share some common grounds, which can be regarded as 
generally accepted attributes of safety: 
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1. Safety is always used in contrast with such negative words as danger, harm, 
hazard, and so on. In other words, safety is expressed by means of these 
words; it is not possible to discuss safety without mentioning these negative 
words. 
2. There is no complete freedom from danger, which implies that absolute 
safety is not available and there is always room for improvement. 
 
There are some other definitions that go into certain details and are specific to 
industrial activities. Mr. Kuo C. (1998) proposed the following definition of safety: 
Safety is perceived quality that determines to what extent the 
management, engineering and operation of a system is free of 
danger to life, property and the environment. 
 
Kuo (1998) also uses this definition to identify the basic aspects of safety and 
address the interrelationship between them under the context of industrial activities. 
Following is a discussion of Kuo’s nomenclature reinforced with this author’s 
viewpoint: 
• System: safety cannot be discussed without referring to any concrete system. 
The discussion of safety is always centered on some specific system, such 
as a ship, a component of a ship, or the process of an operation. For 
example, ship safety, nuclear safety. 
• Quality: quality is an abstract word, here it can be interpreted as attribute, 
characteristic. To the author’s understanding safety is one of the attributes, 
characteristics of the system subjected to a specified circumstance at a 
specific time. 
• Extent: extent implies the idea that there is no complete safety, 100% safety 
does not exist. 
• Danger to life, property and environment: Under the context of industrial 
activities life, property and environment are the main victims of negative 
events happened to the system, for example, fire, explosion; therefore the 
aim of carrying out safety activities is to protect life, property and 
environment, and reduce the damage, harm to life, property and environment. 
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Accordingly the degree of the damage, harm to life, property and 
environment is taken as the indicator of safety performance. 
• Management, engineering, and operation of the system: It is obvious that the 
safety performance of the system is determined by the internal factors within 
the system and the external factors from the circumstance where the system 
is situated. There are many factors within the system that directly or 
indirectly affect the safety performance of it. According to their specific ways 
of affecting safety these factors can be grouped into three main categories: 
management, engineering and operation. Although management, 
engineering and operation affect the system’s safety performance from 
different perspectives and angles, they are functioning interactively rather 
than independently. The interaction among them plays an equally important 
role to the safety performance of the system. It is not difficult to observe the 
possible performance of an incorrect operation of a carefully designed 
system, and the difficulty to operate a poorly designed system. Also a high 
standard performance of operation will never be expected under poor 
management. It is virtually not possible to improve safety performance to a 
satisfactory level by solely working on any one of these factors. Therefore, 
for the purpose of enhancement of safety efforts shall not be directed at 
management, engineering and operation separately and independently, 
instead, attention should be paid to the mechanism that management, 
engineering and operation interact with each other, and a balanced approach 
should be adopted to improve management, engineering and operation 
together. 
• Determine: since the word “quality” in the definition is abstract, it is difficult 
to grasp its meaning and evaluate it directly. However the abstract “quality” 
can be reflected and indicated by certain concrete parameters or 
specifications. In this term of safety, the “quality” is determined by the 
management, engineering and operation of the system and its external 
circumstance, and reflected by the extent to which the system is free from 
danger. Therefore, in order to avoid confusion and misunderstanding it is 
better to replace the word “determines” with ”is reflected”. 
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• Perceived: “perceived” is a critical word in the definition and it implies the 
“subjectivity” of the term - safety, which means that safety is the personal 
perception of the actual situation depending on people’s background, 
experience, knowledge, skill, personality, and so on. Towards the same 
situation individuals could have different perception of the safety level of the 
same system. Now we are facing such questions as: whose perception is the 
correct reflection of the actual situation? All of them are correct or none of 
them is correct? What is the real level of safety, or dose the real level of 
safety exist? If it does exist, is it within the capability of human beings to 
know that?  
 
To understand these questions and go further on to look for the answers to 
them, it is necessary to examine the way that human beings interact with the 
world. By means of “sense organs” like eyes, ears, fingers, human beings 
interact with the world. For example, when you touch the surface of the table 
with your fingers, you may have the judgment that “the surface of the table is 
smooth”. While in fact this judgment is just your personal perception, not 
necessarily the real situation of the table. To be accurate, you should say, ”I 
feel that the surface of the table is smooth”. By perceiving the world human 
beings learn about the outside world and accumulate knowledge about the 
world. Such information and knowledge about the world perceived by human 
beings becomes the basis which human beings fully rely on to make 
decisions and to explore the world. Due to the limitation of human beings 
there is always a difference to a certain degree between the actual situation 
and human’s perception of it, therefore it would be better to have everything, 
every judgment based on the actual situation, however, the problem is that 
how do human beings know that? To work according to the perception is the 
only way available for human beings to interact with world although it is not 
perfect. Fortunately, the human society does not require anything to be 
perfect, to work according to the perception is able to satisfy the needs of 
human beings to a considerable degree, and the continuous development of 
the human society is strong evidence that it is an acceptable and suitable 
way for human beings.  
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Safety is a typical example of the human beings’ perception of the actual 
world. Each individual has its own sufficient reasons for his or her perception 
of safety. What safety practitioners should do is not to judge whose 
perception is right or wrong, instead, they should take into account the 
perceptions of all people concerned and consider them holistically. Therefore 
the purpose of safety activities is to enhance safety to a level that is based 
on the perception of all people concerned as a whole, and the effort shall be 
directed at enhancing the perceived safety level accordingly.  
 
Based on the above discussion on the basic aspects of safety, especially about the 
word “determine”, and in order to show the relevance of safety to system, 
circumstance and time, the author would like to propose the following definition of 
safety: 
Safety is the perceived quality of a system under certain 
circumstance at a specific time, which is reflected by the extent to 
which the management, engineering and operation of a system is 
free of danger to life, property and the environment. 
 
2.1.2. The interpretation of risk 
 
Risk is not a new word to everybody and its meaning seems to be very obvious. 
While in fact not everybody is able to interpret it in a correct and accurate way, 
sometimes it is regarded as the synonym of “hazard”, sometimes it is interpreted as 
“chance or probability”. In the “Interim Guidelines for the Application of Formal 
Safety Assessment (FSA) to the IMO Rule-making Process”, the International 
Maritime Organization defines risk as “the combination of the frequency and the 
severity of the consequence”(IMO, 1997). Sir Frederick Warner proposes a 
similar definition with some further elaboration: “Risk is a combination of the 
probability, or frequency, of occurrence of a defined hazard and the 
magnitude of the consequences of the occurrence” (Warner, 1992). 
 
These definitions interpret the concept of risk concisely and precisely. In order to 
have a deep and accurate understanding of risk, it is essential to examine the 
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meaning of those terms which are either contained in the definition of risk or closely 
related with risk, such as hazard, accident, frequency, consequence and so on. In 
the “Interim Guidelines for the Application of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) to the 
IMO Rule-making Process” the definitions of such terms are provided in the context 
of the maritime industry: (IMO, 1997) 
Hazard - a potential to threaten human life, health, property or the environment. 
Accident - an unintended event involving fatality, injury, ship loss or damage, other 
property loss or damage, or environmental damage. 
Consequence - the outcome of an accident. 
Frequency - the number of occurrences per unit time (e.g. per year). 
Initiating event - the first of a sequence of events leading to a hazardous situation 
or accident. 
In IMO Maritime Safety Committee meeting document “Formal safety assessment: 
basic glossary of terms”, which was submitted by the International Association of 
Classification Societies, further definitions are provided: 
Hazardous situation - a physical situation with a potential to threaten human life, 
health, property or the environment. 
Incident - an unforeseen or unexpected event which has the potential to become an 
accident but in which injury to personnel and/or damage to ship or the environment 
does not materialize; a ”near miss”. 
 
The relation between these terms is critical for the understanding of risk and can be 
exemplified by an accident taken from the casualty investigation report  “Safety 
Digest” (3/2000) published by Maritime Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), Great 
Britain: 
Another Leak + Heat = Fire 
The Luxembourg registered high-speed craft Diamant suffered an engine 
room fire while on passage from Ostend to Dover during August 1998. 
The fire was quickly extinguished using the drencher system. Securing 
bolts on a main engine high-pressure fuel pump were found to have 
fractured. This allowed the pump to move, disturbing pipework, and 
resulting in fuel impinging on a hot surface, most probably an indicator 
cock. 
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This is a typical case of engine room fire caused by leaking fuel. In this case the hot 
surface is a hazard. The hazard is something in the system concerned that has just 
a potential threat and does not necessarily evolve into accident unless certain 
conditions are met. The hot surface itself cannot initiate a fire unless it meets fuel 
and its temperature is high enough. The fracture of securing bolts is the initiating 
event, which consequently allowed the pump to move, the moving pump disturbed 
the pipework, and then fuel leakage on the hot surface caused fire. The fire is the 
accident that is unintended and involves certain damage to the equipment in the 
engine room. The damage, which is the outcome of the accident, is the 
consequence. Suppose in the routine check the engineer noticed the fuel leakage, 
which is a hazardous situation, and took remedial actions in time before the fire 
developed, this accident would not happen and it would be called an incident, or 
“near miss”. In the sequence starting from the initiating event (fracture of bolts) to 
the accident (fire), since there is always the chance or probability to prevent the 
accident, the happening of the accident (fire) would not be 100%. There is a 
probability for it, which can also be indicated by the frequency. In this case the 
combination of the frequency of the fire and the severity of the damage caused by 
the fire is the risk under this specific situation and related with this specific hazard of 
the “hot surface”. If the situation of the system changed, the frequency and the 
severity of the accident will change, accordingly the risk will change. If under the 
same situation, another hazard is considered, everything concerned will be different 
including the nature of the possible accident, frequency and the severity of the 
accident, accordingly the risk level will be different. Therefore risk has to be 
considered under the context of a specified situation of the system concerned and 
with connection to certain hazards (within the system or external to the system), or 
accidents, for example, “the risk presented by this hazard under the situation …”, 
“the risk of fire on board this ship taking into account all hazards…” 
 
Risk is also subject to human perceptions. Given the same situation, individuals 
could have different perceptions of the risk level. The product of the frequency and 
consequence is not the only way to “combine” them; individuals have different ways 
of “combining” the frequency and consequence, for example, “There is a clear 
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perception in society that a single accident that kills 1,000 people is worse than 
1,000 accidents that kill a single person” (IMO, 1997). 
 
2.1.3. Relation between safety and risk 
 
Having examined the meaning of safety and risk, the relation between them would 
not be difficult to understand. In short, safety concerns the extent to which the 
system is free of danger to life, property and the environment. The less the danger 
presented by the system, the more freedom from danger is enjoyed by human 
beings, which can also be called as “safer”. Therefore the extent to which the 
system presents danger, causes harm and damage to life, property and the 
environment reflects the level of safety from the reversed direction. Since risk 
concerns both the frequency and severity of consequence, it is adequate and 
suitable to represent the extent to which the system presents danger to life, property 
and the environment, and consequently the level of safety from the reversed 
direction: higher risk, less safety; lower risk, more safety. So it is reasonable and 
appropriate to improve safety by controlling and reducing risks. In addition “safety” is 
an abstract term, while the term risk is more concrete than the term safety and can 
be qualified and quantified by various means. It is therefore practical to represent 
safety by means of risk and improve safety by managing risks. 
 
2.2. Traditional ways of dealing with maritime safety 
 
Shipping has always been regarded as a risky business and from the beginning 
safety has been a very basic issue in the design, construction and operation of ships, 
because no cargo owners are willing to have their cargoes carried by a ship that is 
going to sink. Therefore people have been working hard continuously to improve 
shipping safety throughout history in order to maintain and develop the shipping 
business. By looking at the history of shipping, from the first ancient wooden canoe 
to the present VLCC, container ship, cruise ship, it is not difficult to see how much 
people have achieved by their continuous efforts in ship building and shipping, as 
well as maritime safety, which is an integral part of the maritime industry. Now let us 
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have a look at how people have been dealing with maritime safety traditionally and 
what is the present situation of maritime safety. 
 
2.2.1. “Learning from experiences” 
 
 “Learning from experiences” is the basic traditional approach that people deal with 
safety, in fact this is also the basic method that people learn and accumulate 
knowledge in every area. The core of this approach is “past experience” which 
constitutes the basis of decision-making. The circles in Figure 2.1, as proposed by 
this author, illustrate the basic theory of this approach. 
 
Figure 2.1: The circle of “learning form experiences” 
 
The starting point of the circle is that people take action according to past 
experiences, the outcome of which could be success or failure. In case of success 
past experiences will be confirmed and reinforced. In case of failure people will 
review and investigate the subject matter in order to identify the underlying reasons. 
Do according 
to experience 
Succeed
Reinforce / 
confirm old 
experience 
Successful mode Failure mode 
Fail 
Review 
Draw lesson, 
and change 
Do according 
to experience
New 
experience
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Then people will draw lessons from the failure and make necessary changes, which 
will become new experiences to guide future actions. A typical example of the failure 
mode of “learning from experiences” is the Titanic accident: before the Titanic 
accident, people were only concerned about intact stability, which is the past 
experience, after the accident people realized the importance of damage stability, 
which is the new experience. Afterwards the new experience --- damage stability 
criteria were applied to ships. This approach can be summarized in the following 
statement: Keep and follow past experiences until something goes wrong so 
that improvements have to be made. 
 
2.2.2. Scientific research and development 
 
The scientific research and development is the other way that people deal with 
maritime safety.  Scientists and experts from various sectors concerned by maritime 
safety, such as shipyards, classification societies, maritime Administrations, 
equipment manufactures, technical institutions and so on, have been actively 
conducting research for the purpose of improving maritime safety. Scientific 
researches have very wide coverage, from structural strength, engines, navigation 
equipment, to operations, ship maneuvering, cargo handling, safety management 
and so on. Some scientific researches and development focus on existing problems 
and could provide solutions to them, some focus on the training of seafarers and 
may produce more effective training facilities, and some researches may provide 
guidance for the more effective and efficient administration and management of 
maritime safety. In short, the scientific research and development has made a 
valuable contribution to the improvement of maritime safety. 
 
Although the above approaches are discussed separately, they are in fact closely 
connected. The approach “learning from experiences” is also the underlying 
principle of the scientific research and development, and the review and 
investigation of the failure in “learning from experiences” would inevitably involve 
scientific researches in order to identify the underlying reasons behind the failure. 
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2.2.3. The present situation of maritime safety 
 
Nowadays there is a complex maritime safety framework in place internationally and 
nationally, in which the main players are ship owners/operators, maritime 
Administrations, classification societies, shipyards. The fundamental basis of the 
framework is a regulatory regime on maritime safety and environmental protection, 
which consists of international and national rules and regulations, such as IMO 
Conventions, national legislations, and class rules. This regulatory regime provides 
for the responsibilities and obligations of the players in maritime sector, the 
standards concerning safety, environmental protection and seafarers, and so on. 
The safety performance of the maritime industry largely depends on the quality of 
this regulatory regime, and the effective implementation of it by all players. The 
basic approach of the present regulatory regime is to provide safeguards against 
identified hazards and remedies for failures. By “learning from experiences” and 
scientific researches, maritime people have identified considerable hazards and 
provided necessary safeguards against them and remedies for them, which are 
reflected in safety rules and regulations. Through years of accumulation this 
regulatory regime has already become considerably complete. For example, there 
are technical requirements in IMO Conventions provided against engineering 
hazards, such as structure failure, fire/explosion; there are STCW Convention 
against hazards related with operations, ISM Code against hazards related with 
management, COLREG Convention against hazards external to the ship, and so on. 
In short, the present regulatory regime has addressed all perceived hazards and 
provided safeguards and remedies (Smith, 1999). 
 
2.3. Risk-based approach to maritime safety 
 
The risk-based approach is a scientific method that deals with safety by controlling 
risks in a systematic way.  The core of this approach is “risk”, such as analysis of 
risks, quantification of risks, evaluation and reduction of risks, and so on. Developed 
in recent years, this approach has been widely applied in the nuclear and offshore 
industry and proved to be a useful, powerful tool to deal with safety issues.  Risk 
management might be an appropriate name for this approach, which is defined by 
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Warner (1992) as “The process whereby decisions are made to accept a known 
or assessed risk and/or the implementation of actions to reduce the 
consequences or probability of occurrence.” The basis of the risk-based 
approach is risk assessment, which is “the integrated analysis of the risks inherent 
in a product, system or plant and their significance in an appropriate context” 
(Warner, 1992). Generally risk assessment comprises the following steps: (Warner, 
1992) 
• Hazard identification 
• Risk estimation or analysis (quantification of frequency and severity of 
accidents) 
• Risk evaluation (risk criteria, risk acceptability) 
Based on the risk level obtained from risk assessment and the result of risk 
evaluation, risk reduction measures will be considered and the benefit will be 
evaluated against their cost, which is called cost/benefit assessment, finally based 
upon the above analysis, decisions will be made to accept the risk and implement 
risk reduction measures. 
 
According to Hood et al. (1992), the advantages of the risk-based approach are the 
following: 
• It is a systematic process; decisions are made on the basis of scientific 
analysis and in a rational way. 
• It is a proactive approach, which can identify new hazards and excessive risk 
areas, therefore risk reduction measures could be taken to prevent accidents 
from happening. 
• Quantification of the risk level can help people to understand and be aware 
of the safety situation more clearly. 
• Cost/benefit assessment can keep the balance among all risk areas. 
 
2.4. Necessity of the risk-based approach 
 
Under the traditional approach a complete safety framework and a regulatory regime 
have been established, and enormous improvements and progresses have been 
achieved. There are, however, still some problems that have been baffling maritime 
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safety sector for many years, or for which the traditional approach could not provide 
satisfactory answers. For example, how safe is safe enough? What safety level 
does the current maritime safety regulatory regime provide? Why is the maritime 
safety sector so reactive that measures were always taken after major accidents 
have already happened? In addition, even when measures have been taken after 
accidents, people still do not know exactly how much the safety level has been 
improved by such measures. There is also the dilemma that on one hand, there are 
a lot of complaints from the society that the maritime industry is not safe enough, 
because there are always serious accidents happening now and then, which make 
people question the effectiveness of maritime safety regime; on the other hand, 
there are a lot of complaints from the shipping industry that there are too many 
safety rules and regulations, and the economic burden of fulfilling safety 
requirements is so heavy that it is going to kill the industry.  
 
From the discussion about the advantages of the risk-based approach in Section 1.3, 
we can see that the risk-based approach can provide certain solutions to the 
problems and questions mentioned above: 
• Risk criteria, risk acceptability and cost/benefit assessment can help to 
understand the problem of “how safe is safe enough?”  
• Quantified risk assessment can provide a clear picture of the safety situation; 
therefore people can see the risk level they are facing, and cost/benefit 
assessment can make people aware of the additional cost needed to further 
reduce the risk level. As a result the society will be more willing to accept the 
risk, and will not complain too much on the safety level of the maritime 
industry. 
• The risk-based approach is a proactive approach, which can identify new 
hazards and excessive risk areas so that safeguards could be taken before 
accidents happen, thereby reducing the number of serious accidents, 
improving maritime safety, and reducing complaints from the society. 
• Cost/benefit assessment can keep the balance among all risk areas and 
safety measures, and rationalize the regulatory regime, which will help to 
reduce the risk level, enhance the safety level in a rational, practicable and 
balanced manner, and obtain more understanding from the maritime industry. 
 17
• The risk-based approach can provide more transparency in the decision-
making process; therefore it can promote the understanding of the industry 
on the necessity of safety measures and the willingness to accept them. 
• When performance-based regulations are adopted by the Administration, the 
risk-based approach can provide more flexibility for the industry in achieving 
the safety standard set by the Administration.  
• Quantification of the risk level can illustrate the extent of safety improvement 
achieved by the new measures implemented after accidents, which helps 
people to see more clearly the effectiveness of the new measures, thereby 
achieving more consensuses on them. 
 
To provide a firm foundation for this dissertation, this chapter discussed the very 
basic issues about safety and risk, the traditional and risk-based approach to safety, 
and finally identified the advantages and necessity of the risk-based approach. 
Based upon this, this dissertation will move on to explore in detail the risk-based 
approach to maritime safety from different perspectives. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The general procedure of risk-based approach to safety 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
As a systematic process, the procedure is of the first importance to the risk-based 
approach. This chapter will discuss the general procedure of risk-based approach 
step by step, and then analyze the uncertainty that exists in risk assessment, which 
is major limitation to this approach. 
 
As a powerful flexible tool, risk-based approach can be applied to different cases 
under different contexts, and in different ways to suit different purposes and 
circumstances. The general procedure, however, is roughly the same for all cases. 
There is plenty of literature about the procedure of risk-based approach under 
different contexts, which summarizes the general procedure as follows (Jenner, 
1997; IMO, 1997; Warner, 1992): 
• Risk assessment 
- Definition and description of the system 
- Identification of hazards 
- Risk analysis (qualitatively or quantitatively) 
- Risk evaluation 
• Identification of risk reduction or control measures 
• Cost benefit (effectiveness) assessment 
• Recommendation for decision-making 
 
This author proposes Figure 3.1 as a simple illustration of the risk-based approach: 
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Figure 3.1 General procedure of the risk-based approach 
 
3.2. Risk assessment 
 
3.2.1. Definition and description of the system 
 
Risk assessment is conducted with regard to certain systems for the purpose of 
solving certain safety problems. The system concerned and its boundaries should 
therefore be defined clearly, the current situation of the system and the problem 
existed should be described, and the purpose of the risk assessment should be 
Risk assessment 
Definition and description of the system
Identification of hazards
Risk analysis 
Risk evaluation 
Identificaiotn of risk reduction or control measures 
Recommendation for decision making
Cost benefit (effectiveness) assessment
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presented clearly as well. For example, the system could be a ship, a category of 
ships (oil tankers, bulk carriers), the fleet of a shipping company, certain areas of a 
ship (engine room, bridge), ship equipment, shipping company, maritime 
Administrations.  
 
3.2.2. Identification of hazards 
 
This step is to “identify and generate a prioritized list of hazards, specific to the 
problem under review” (IMO, 1997). The reason for this step is that we need to know 
firstly what could go wrong in the system before estimating the risk and deciding on 
the risk reduction action (Kuo, 1998). In this step two layers of objectives should be 
achieved: (IMO, 2001a) 
• The primary objectives are: 
- Completeness Full list of potential hazards 
- Knowledge–based Be aware of past accidents and other work 
- Multi–disciplinary Allow lateral thinking from diverse experiences 
• The secondary objectives are: 
- Auditability Possible to track the process, well documented 
- Structure To ensure completeness and quality of documentation 
- Efficiency Focus on immediate problem, useful for other purposes 
 
To ensure the realization of the above-mentioned objectives, certain principles 
should be followed, Kuo (1998) proposed the following principles for hazard 
identification: 
• Understand the mechanism the system works, the planned path of the 
system and the associated assumptions. 
• Identify the possible deviation from the planned path, the possible cause and 
effect of the deviation. 
• Document all the identified deviation. 
 
To achieve the objectives mentioned above, standard techniques, analytical or 
creative, should be adopted for hazard identification, such as Brainstorming, What-If 
analysis, Checklist, the hazard and operability analysis, FMEA, FMECA, and so on. 
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“The analytical techniques can ensure that previous experience is taken into 
account properly and systematically; the creative techniques can ensure that the 
process is proactive, and not confined only to hazards that have materialized in the 
past” (IMO, 1997). Appropriate techniques should be chosen according to the 
characteristics of the system under consideration and the types of hazards as well 
(IMO, 2001b). 
 
Hazards can be grouped into different types according to their characteristics. Kuo  
(1998) believes that grouping hazards is beneficial in that it allows one to choose the 
most appropriate identification techniques for that type of hazard, select suitable risk 
analysis techniques, and facilitate the process of seeking suitable risk reduction 
measures according to the type. 
 
Various ways of grouping hazards can be employed for different purposes. 
Considering the discussion on the term safety, the author proposes to group 
hazards as follows: 
 
• Internal hazards: 
- Management hazards 
- Engineering hazards 
- Operational hazards 
 
• External hazards: 
- Hazards from natural environment 
- Hazards from political environment 
- Hazards from other systems 
- Hazards from commercial environment 
 
The identified hazards will be screened and prioritized according to the significance, 
which can be undertaken by using historical statistics and professional judgment. 
This ranking is just a coarse and rough screening and prioritization of hazards. This 
process helps people to better understand hazards identified, focus on significant 
hazards and facilitates the procedures followed (IMO, 1997). 
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The output of hazard identification is a prioritized list of hazards, and a preliminary 
description of the development of hazards to final outcomes (IMO, 1997). 
 
3.2.3. Risk analysis 
 
This step is to estimate the risk level and identify the distribution of risks among 
categories and sub-categories of accidents. The analysis could be qualitative or 
quantitative as required by the actual situation. It involves the systematic analysis of 
the developing path from hazards to final accidents, the causal chain of accidents, 
the accident scenario, and so on. In short, the connection between hazards and 
accidents will be carefully examined and established, this also facilitates the 
understanding of the operating mechanism of the system. Various techniques are 
available for risk analysis, such as Event Tree Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, neural 
network, fuzzy set, and so on. Since the demand for historical data is very heavy in 
the risk analysis process, from the very beginning insufficient data has been a major 
difficulty confronting risk analysts. When historical data are not sufficient and reliable, 
expert judgement can be employed for the analysis. 
 
There are two fundamental expressions of risks: individual risk and societal risk in 
terms of human life.  Individual risk can be regarded as “the risk of death, injury and 
ill health to an individual in isolation” (IMO, 1997), such as crews, passengers, and 
so on. The widely used expression is mortality rate, for example 10-3 annually. The 
mortality rate can also be expressed relative to other measure units, such as 
passenger-hours, passenger-miles, and so on. Loss of Life Expectancy is used to 
express individual risk of injury and ill health. Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) can 
be used as an integrated indicator for the risk of death, injury and ill health. 
 
Societal risk can be regarded as “the risk to society of a major accident” (IMO, 1997). 
Societal risk can be expressed by means of FN curve, a diagram where the 
frequency (F) of “N or more fatalities” is plotted against the “N or more fatalities” 
(See Figure 3.2). Using FN curve the frequency of accidents with different 
consequence magnitude can be illustrated clearly, as well as the risk level 
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(Grossland, et al. 1993). Another way to express societal risk is Potential Loss of 
Life (PLL), which represents the number of annual fatalities. 
 
Risk may also be expressed by monetary units, for example 105 US$ annually, 
where the loss of human life, damage to property and environment are represented 
by monetary units. Theoretically this is a perfect alternative to express risks, 
however, in practice, it is very hard to have consensus on the value of human life, 
and even the idea of “value of human life” could not be accepted generally. 
 
3.2.4. Risk evaluation 
 
Once the risk level has been estimated, it will be evaluated against the risk 
acceptance / tolerance criteria with the purpose of deciding whether measures 
should be taken to reduce the risk level.  There are mandatory risk evaluation 
criteria established by government as well as voluntary criteria set up by companies 
for their own safety practices.  Generally there are three risk levels: Intolerable, As 
Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and Negligible (IMO, 1997). 
 
• Intolerable – The risk is very high and cannot be justified so that measure 
should be taken to reduce risk level regardless of cost. 
• Negligible – The risk is so small that no risk reduction is necessary. 
• ALARP –The risk falls between the other two states. It is also called 
Tolerable level, meaning that the risk is tolerable in this region. Risk 
reduction measures may or may not be taken depending upon the cost-
effectiveness of them. If the risk reduction measure is cost-effective, it should 
be taken to reduce the risk as low as reasonably practicable. If the cost of 
the measure outweighs the benefit, then no action needs to be taken to 
reduce the risk. 
 
The following are some examples of risk evaluation criteria for individual risk (IMO, 
2000 attributes Health Safety Executive, 1999): 
• Maximum tolerable risk for crew members 10-3 annually 
• Maximum tolerable risk for passengers 10-4 annually 
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• Maximum tolerable risk for public ashore 10-4 annually 
• Negligible risk 10-6 annually 
 
Risk evaluation criteria for societal risk can be shown by diagrams, Figure 3.2 is an 
example of the diagram: 
 
Figure 3.2: FN curves for different tankers, shown together with established risk 
acceptance curves. Data from 1978-1998. (Data source: LMIS) 
Source: International Maritime Organization, MSC 72/16, 2000. 
 
3.3. Risk reduction or control measure 
 
According to the evaluation of risk level risk reduction or control measures should be 
identified. By looking at the developing path of hazards into accidents, risk control 
measures can be classified into two groups: preventive measures and mitigating 
measures. Preventive measures aim at reducing the likelihood of failures and 
accidents, in short, controlling the frequency. Mitigating measures aim at reducing 
the severity of failures and accidents, in short, controlling the escalation of failures 
and accidents (IMO, 1997). 
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As there are hazards internal to the system, like management, engineering and 
operation, and there are hazards external to the system, risk control measures can 
be identified at where hazards exist. Therefore risk control measures can be 
identified aiming at improving management, engineering and operation of the 
system, and aiming at alleviating the negative environment of the system. 
 
Once risk control measures have been identified, they should be grouped and 
organized into practical control options, which will be assessed for their cost-
effectiveness at the later stage. 
 
3.4. Cost benefit (effectiveness) assessment 
 
Cost benefit assessment is an important feature of the risk-based approach to safety, 
which would ensure the balance among the risk control options. Safety costs money, 
if the cost of a risk control option outweighs its benefit: the improved safety or the 
reduced risk that such “cost” could achieve, then this risk control option is not 
regarded as cost-effective. There are two ways to conduct such assessment: Cost 
Benefit Assessment (CBA) and Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA). 
 
In Cost Benefit Assessment (CBA) all losses (life, injury, ill health, property, 
environmental) are converted to monetary units, as well as all benefits. Then the 
benefit is simply compared with the cost in monetary terms.  This approach seems 
to perfectly match the theoretical idea of such assessment, however, big difficulty 
arises when it comes to the “value of life”. Although many ways are available to 
estimate the “value of life”, there is no general consensus on it. 
 
In Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA), a ratio of costs to benefits is presented in 
order to avoid putting a value to “life”. The ratio will then be compared with the 
criterion determined by decision-makers. Basically the ratio represents the amount 
of resources needed to reduce per unit risk, i.e. one life annually. Accordingly the 
criterion on this ratio represents the amount of resources that the society is willing to 
spend in order to reduce per unit risk, i.e. saving one life annually. 
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In practice the cost effectiveness is expressed in forms of Implied Cost of Averting a 
Fatality (ICAF), or Cost of Unit Risk Reduction (CURR) (IMO, 2000). 
 
Risk
CostICAF
∆
∆
=  
 
∆Cost is the marginal (additional) cost of the risk control option, whilst ∆Risk is 
the reduced risk in terms of fatalities averted. ICAF is also called as Gross Cost of 
Averting a Fatality (Gross CAF) (IMO, 2000). 
 
Risk
nefitsEconomicBeICAF
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 In CURR the economic benefits of risk control options are accounted for, such as 
risk reduction in property, environment, and so on. CURR is also called as Net Cost 
of Averting a Fatality (Net CAF) (IMO, 2000). 
 
Table 3.1 below gives some examples of criteria of ICAF. 
 
Table 3.1: Published ICAFs in use as acceptance criteria  
Source: International Maritime Organization, MSC 72/16, 2000. 
Published ICAFs in use as acceptance criteria 
ORGANISATION SUBJECT ICAF 
US Federal Highway 
Administration Road Transport $2.5m (£1.6m) 
UK Department of 
Transport Road transport 
£1.0 m (1998, uprated with GDP per 
capita) 
UK Health & Safety 
Executive Industrial safety As above or higher 
Railtrack (UK rail 
infrastructure controller) Overground railways As above to £2.65m  
London Underground Ltd Underground railways £2m  
EU  Road Transport ECU 1 million (£0.667m) 
Norway All hazards  NOK 10m (£0.8m) 
 
3.5. Recommendation for decision making 
 
In this step the cost-effectiveness of risk control options are compared, based on the 
comparison recommendations will be given to decision-makers for consideration. 
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3.6. Uncertainty in risk assessment 
 
Having introduced the general procedure of the risk-based approach to safety, 
readers may have got deeper understanding about the advantages of this approach. 
However, nothing in the world is perfect, the limitation of this approach should also 
be properly identified and addressed to ensure the effective implementation in 
practice. The main limitation of the risk-based approach is the uncertainty inherent in 
the process, which attracts heavy criticism from those who are against this approach, 
and affects people’s confidence in this approach. Nevertheless, it will not affect the 
advantages if it is properly recognized and treated. In this section, types, sources of 
the uncertainty, the treatment of and appropriate attitude to that will be discussed. 
 
It is very important to distinguish two types of uncertainties (Bolsover et al., 1998): 
 
• Variability (also called as random uncertainty, inherent uncertainty or Type A 
uncertainty). This is due to natural randomness, e.g. the variation in wind 
speed over time. It can be defined more accurately by repeated 
measurements. 
• Epistemic uncertainty (also called as Type B uncertainty). This is due to lack 
of knowledge and information. It includes uncertainties in modeling and data 
collection, and can be reduced by gathering more information and increased 
knowledge. 
 
Generally, according to the source the uncertainty can be grouped into data-related 
and methodology-related uncertainties. 
 
3.6.1. Data-related uncertainty 
 
Using historical data is a relatively reliable way to quantify risk level compared with 
others. However data could give rise to some uncertainty due to the applicability of 
historical data to the current situation, and the completeness of data (White, 2001). 
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Historical data reflect the previous situation; when historical data are applied to the 
current situation to estimate the current risk level, there is an assumption that the 
situation has not changed over this period of time. However, the situation is 
changing all the time, including the system itself and the external operating 
environment. Therefore, the uncertainty will arise when historical data are applied to 
the current situation. Fortunately such change is occurring very slowly, especially in 
the shipping industry, which has a long history and is considered to be very 
conservative. In addition, since the life cycle of a ship is normally over 20 years the 
total “sudden step-change” is very unlikely to occur, instead, it is evolving gradually. 
Therefore the uncertainty arising from the changing situation is not big. 
 
Since it is extremely impossible for every accident to be reported and recorded, the 
risk level estimated by historical data will obviously be lower than the risk in reality. 
Although there are several organizations in the world that are collecting casualty 
data, complete data are still impossible. However, major accidents were always 
recorded, so in certain high-risk areas, data may be regarded as sufficient. 
 
3.6.2. Methodology-related uncertainty 
 
The uncertainty may also come from some areas related with methodology and 
modeling, such as quantification of human element, the use of professional 
judgement, and the existence of simplifying assumption (White, 2001). 
 
The contribution of human elements to safety has been widely recognized, however, 
the quantification of it is a very challenging task that involves considerable 
uncertainty. Although the risk-based approach is considered as an objective process, 
professional judgement is used everywhere in the process, especially when data are 
not sufficient (Grossland, et al. 1993). To model the system assumptions have to be 
made with regard to various situations, which also introduce uncertainties to the 
process. 
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3.6.3. Treatment of the uncertainty 
 
It is an unchangeable fact that the uncertainty in the risk-based approach will always 
exist to a certain degree, there are no ways to avoid it, and the only proper way 
available is to treat the uncertainty explicitly thereby improving the confidence in the 
risk-based approach. Some uncertainty are quantifiable, others are less tractable. 
As recommended by Carr et al., (1995) the best way of treating uncertainty is “best 
estimate with uncertainty quantified as fully as possible”. Therefore the general 
principle is to quantify uncertainties that are quantifiable; for those that are not 
quantifiable, qualitative analysis should be made explicitly.   
 
3.6.3.1. Treatment of the uncertainty related with data 
 
To handle this kind of uncertainty proper selection of data and methodology is the 
key: data should be selected to reflect the actual situation of the system concerned, 
and the methodology should be able to handle the variance in input data. Various 
techniques are available for the quantification of the uncertainty, such as Monte 
Carlo tools, Bayesian analysis, sensitivity analysis, maximum/minimum bound 
estimates, and so on (Bolsover et al., 1998). 
 
Carr et al. (1995) recommended a practical scheme for the quantitative assessment 
of the overall uncertainty, which can be implemented by means of Monte Carlo 
simulation technique. The theory is as follows: The process of the risk-based 
approach involves data inputs, mathematics analysis and outputs, in the 
conventional deterministic approach, input parameters are treated as single values 
as well as output parameters (as presented in Figure 3.2). In the Monte Carlo 
simulation probalistic approach, input parameters are treated as random variables 
whose uncertainty is represented by probabilistic distributions, accordingly, output 
parameters are in the form of probability distributions rather than single values (as 
presented in Figure 3.3). Therefore the output will not only represent the “most likely 
value” that can be defined in various way for different purpose, such as mean, 
median, and so on, but also represent the probability of such  “most likely value”. 
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For example, the risk level is 10-6 annually, the probability of the risk level being 10-6 
is 90%. In this way the uncertainty can be clearly and explicitly illustrated.  
Figure 3.3: Treatment of uncertainty related with data 
 
3.6.3.2. Treatment of the uncertainty related with methodology and 
modeling 
 
This kind of uncertainty is more difficult to handle than the uncertainty related with 
data. Bolsover et al. (1998) suggested that using a wide range of modeling 
approaches could provide some insights to this kind of uncertainty. In addition 
understanding and recognition of limitations of models will also help for this. 
 
3.6.4. Attitude towards the uncertainty 
 
The existence of uncertainties is not a shame or substantial drawback to the risk-
based approach; to avoid discussing uncertainties is of course not an honest and 
convincing way to serve decision-makers and the public. In addition the human 
world does not require everything to be perfect, human beings act for certain 
purposes, not just for the sake of the act itself. In the context of safety, human 
beings conduct risk assessment for the purpose of mitigating risks and improving 
safety, therefore, the whole process of risk assessment serves this purpose. In 
return, this purpose will determine how risk assessment should be carried out, 
including the degree of accuracy and uncertainty of it. So the realistic goal, as 
deterministic 
treatment 
probalistic 
treatment 
Single 
value  
Single 
value  
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input 
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Grossland (1993) indicated, is that the accuracy should be “adequate in relation to 
the needs and to enable effective mitigation of risks." It is not necessary to quantify 
the uncertainty to a fixed degree under all circumstances. Sometimes the actual 
situation may require the uncertainty to be quantified. Under some circumstances 
qualitative assessment of uncertainties might satisfy the need. Whatever ways to 
treat uncertainty, the issue of uncertainty should not be avoided; it should be 
identified, highlighted, and analyzed explicitly. 
 
This chapter summarized and discussed the general procedure of the risk-based 
approach, which further illustrated the systematic feature of this approach. The 
uncertainty issue related with this approach is analyzed, which help to provide a 
complete recognition of the risk-based approach with regard to advantages and 
limitations. Under the general framework built up in this chapter, this dissertation will 
move on to discuss the various scientific techniques to reflect the scientific feature of 
the risk-based approach. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Techniques of risk-based approach 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The application of the risk-based approach needs the proper procedure and suitable 
techniques. Having discussed the general procedure of the risk-based approach, 
this Chapter will look at various techniques that are currently employed for the risk-
based approach. The techniques nowadays available mostly focus on the risk 
assessment step of the risk-based approach; therefore they are very often called as 
risk assessment techniques. In this chapter the most commonly used techniques will 
be described, and their characteristics discussed to identify their strengths and 
weaknesses. A final generalization of all the techniques is provided in the end. 
 
4.2. Brainstorming 
 
Brainstorming “involves the generation of ideas over a specified period by a group of 
people with different interests, expertise and experience” (Kuo, 1998). It is a 
practical and efficient way of organizing expert judgement for various purposes, 
such as the identification of hazards in the system, estimation of probabilities. 
 
First a team is formed consisting of people with a range of experience, knowledge, 
outlook and attitude. A co-ordinator is appointed or selected who is responsible for 
guiding the process, encouraging members to contribute ideas. A fixed time period 
and a target number of ideas are agreed in advance. Once the target is reached, the 
ideas will then be discussed, some maybe grouped together, some maybe 
discarded if too preposterous. The result should be a comprehensive list of items, 
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for example, a list of hazards in the system (Kuo, 1998). As proposed by Kuo, the 
advantages of brainstorming are that the team is with a range of background, 
expertise, experience and knowledge; the approach is flexible and open; and a lot of 
hazards can be generated if team members have overcome the initial inhibitions 
about unusual ideas. Its disadvantages are that team members should have right 
attitude to this open approach; team members have to overcome the initial 
inhibitions about presenting unusual ideas without worrying about being ridiculed 
afterwards; and team member sometimes cannot get going and on the same 
wavelength. 
 
4.3. What-If 
 
What-if analysis is a broad, loosely structured technique, the purpose of which is to 
identify hazards and ensure proper safeguards are in place. This technique has the 
following procedure: (USCG, 2001) 
 
• Define the system concerned 
• Subdivide the system for analysis 
• Generate what-if questions for each element of the system, like “what if the 
relieve valve fails to open” 
• Respond to the what-if questions, such as causes, consequences, 
safeguards, and so on 
 
As a qualitative technique, What-if can be applied to any kind of system, especially 
those with simple failure scenarios. It is often used in combination with other more 
structured methods, such as Checklist analysis. Due to its loose structure of What-if 
technique, some hazards are likely to be missed, and its thoroughness is difficult to 
be audited (USCG, 2001). 
 
4.4. Checklist Analysis 
 
According to the US Coast Guard (2001) “Checklist Analysis is a systematic 
evaluation against pre-established criteria in the form of one or more checklists.” 
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First a checklist is prepared by careful examination of the system, and then items 
are checked one by one to see if any one has gone wrong, and the mitigating action 
is proposed in the checklist record (Hong, 1999). 
 
Checklist analysis is applicable for any kind of system, and often used to guide the 
inspection of the system concerned. The quality of the evaluation is exclusively 
relied upon the knowledge and experience of experts who generate checklists, so if 
the checklist fails to include certain key issue, the analysis is likely to overlook this 
aspect. The simplicity of this method present value for minimal cost, however, only 
qualitative assessment can be provided (USCG, 2001). 
  
4.5. Physical inspection 
 
This method is widely used for hazard identification. The advantage is that the 
safety auditor can see the system himself/herself and does not have to rely on 
reports from others. The disadvantage is the considerable time invested in the 
inspection (Hong, 1999). 
 
4.6. Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) 
 
HAZOP is a qualitative method used to analyse hazards in the system with the aim 
to eliminate or minimise them (IMO, 1997). Its principle is “to identify hazards by 
using “guidewords” to study variations from the design objectives of a system and its 
components” (Kuo, 1998). 
 
The first step in HAZOP procedure is to form a team consisting of designers, 
practical engineers and safety auditors. The whole system is divided into a number 
of smaller and manageable sub-systems that will be examined by guidewords, such 
as “None”, ”More”, ”Less”, and ”other”. The effort is directed at seeking answers to 
the following questions: (Kuo, 1998) 
• The objective of the sub-system concerned 
• The deviations from the stated objective (Generated by combining 
guidewords and properties of the system) 
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• The causes of these deviations 
• The consequences resulting from deviations 
• The actions to eliminate or minimise deviations 
 
Dickson (1987) suggested a complete process of HAZOP by a chart as presented in 
figure 4.1. Sheets with columns for guidewords, deviations, causes, consequences 
and actions are developed to record the findings of the analysis; table 4.1 is an 
example of the sheet for a fuel storage and supply sub-system (Dickson, 1987): 
 
Table 4.1: Hazard and Operability Analysis worksheet 
Source: (Dickson, 1987) 
Guidewords Deviations Causes Consequences Actions 
No No flow • Tank empty 
• Inlet valve 
V1 is shut 
• Pump is not 
working 
• Hose 
blocked 
• No petrol gets 
to vehicles 
• Petrol seeps 
out of pipes 
• Hose bursts 
• Regular chcking 
of tank 
• Vavles to be 
checked 
everyday 
• Regular 
maintenance of 
the pump 
 
HAZOP is used primarily for systems with continuous process, especially fluid, air 
and thermal systems. The advantages of this technique are that It is extensive, 
major hazard will not be omitted; the team benefits from different expertise, 
experience and background; and each part of the system can be examined in detail. 
Its disadvantages are that It requires a well-defined system; investment of time is 
expensive; in case the system is simplified to facilitate the study, there is the risk 
that certain aspects maybe omitted; and it focuses only on identifying single failure, 
it is not able to analyse failure caused by a combination of events. 
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Figure 4.1: Process of Hazard and Operability Analysis 
Source: (Dickson, 1987) 
 
4.7. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is a technique to identify and analyse the 
potential failure mode of a system and its effects, as well as actions that could 
eliminate or mitigate the effects of the potential failure (NASA, 2001). When the 
FMEA is extended by a criticality analysis, the technique is then called failure mode 
and effects criticality analysis (FMECA). It is considered as state-of-art to perform 
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FMECA instead of FMEA. Nowadays some sources call FMEA as Fault Hazard 
Analysis. The theory of FMEA can be illustrated by the following Figure 4.2: 
 
Figure 4.2: Theory of Failure Mode and Effect Analysis  
Source: (NASA, 2001) 
 
The following outlines the process of Failure Mode and Effect Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA): 
 
1. Define the system to be analyzed. 
2. Define the function model and reliability model of the system. Break the 
system down into convenient and logical elements: subsystems, assemblies, 
subassemblies, components, and piece parts. (See Figure 4.3) System 
Breakdown can be either Functional, or Geographic/Architectural, or both 
(i.e., Functional within the Geographic, or vice versa). 
3. Establish a Coding System to identify system elements. 
4. Analyze (FMEA) the elements. Identify the failure modes of elements, 
detection methods, their causes and effects on the system performance at 
different level. 
5. Determine the criticality of failures and rank them. Criticality is the 
combination the severity and frequency of the failure mode, which is the risk 
associated with each failure. 
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6. Formulate corrective actions for each failure mode. The correction and 
mitigation action is usually based on the ranking of the criticality of the 
failure. 
 
Figure 4.3: Block diagram of system subdivision 
Source: (NASA, 2001)  
 
The FMECA Sheet is used to guide and record the analysis, the following is an 
example of it. 
Table 4.2: Failure Mode and Effect Criticality Analysis worksheet 
Source: (NASA, 2001) 
Description Function Failure 
Mode 
Cause 
of 
Failure 
Effect of 
Failure 
(local, 
upper 
level) 
Corrective 
Action 
Detection 
method 
Criticality 
Rank 
        
 
Being a systematic and highly structured technique, FMEA is primarily used in 
mechanical and electrical systems. It can be used as a basis of optimization of 
maintenance plan, and provide valuable information for troubleshooting system. 
 
FMEA could be carried out in a quantitative, semi-quantitative or qualitative manner 
depending on the level of requirement. When the quantitative FMEA is carried out, it 
requires sufficient information on the statistical distribution of component failures 
and good understanding of dependency relationships among components of the 
SYSTEM
SUBSYSTEM 1 
ASSEMBLY 1A ASSEMBLY 1B 
SUBSYSTEM 1 
ASSEMBLY 1A ASSEMBLY 1B 
COMPONENT1B1 COMPONENT 1B2
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system under various operational modes. In some situations quantitative, semi-
quantitative FMEA can well meet the demand. 
 
FMEA only analyzes the effects of a single component failure; it can identify single 
failure modes that may cause system failure, however it is not possible to analyze 
the problems caused by combinations of component failures. In addition FMEA 
focuses on how equipment failure can occur, those human factors, external 
influences that do not cause equipment failure are often overlooked although they 
may present dangers directly to human being or the system as a whole (USCG, 
2001). 
  
4.8. Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
 
“The Preliminary Hazard Analysis technique is a broad, initial study used in the early 
stages of system design” (USCG, 2001). By identifying weaknesses at the early 
stage of a system development, the application of PHA could avoid major redesign 
at a later stage. This technique focuses on identifying hazards, assessing the 
severity of possible accidents, and identifying safeguards to reduce risks. 
 
The general procedure of PHA is as follows: (Vinnem, 1993) 
 
• Definition of subsystem and operational modes 
• Identification of potential hazards 
• Definition of unwanted events 
• Evaluation of unwanted events 
• Evaluation in the PHA sheet 
• Identification of critical and sub-critical events 
• Corrective Action Recommendation Forms 
 
The PHA sheet, as presented in table 4.3, is similar with that of FMEA. PHA 
technique is applicable to any system or activity and commonly used in the early 
stage of system development, often as a precursor to further risk assessment. 
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Table 4.3: Preliminary Hazard Analysis worksheet 
Source: Adapted from (Vinnem, 1993) 
Taxonomy 
number 
Ongoing 
operation 
Unwanted 
event 
Probable 
causes 
Probable 
conseque
n-ces 
Preventive 
actions/ 
contingen-
cies 
Probility 
class 
Conseq-
-uence 
class 
        
        
 
The focus is largely on the identification and classification of hazards.  Since there is 
no detailed information of the system at the early stage, the quality of the risk 
assessment is highly dependent on the knowledge and experience of the team. In 
order to fully assess hazards and potential accidents identified in PHA, further 
follow-up risk assessment need to be carried out (USCG, 2001). 
 
4.9.  Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
 
Fault Tree Analysis is a technique that, by means of tree structures, visually models 
the logical causal relationship between events that singly or in combination cause 
accidents (IMO, 1997). 
 
FTA is a top-down approach where, starting from the top event, the tree is 
systematically developed by identifying the causes at lower levels. Logical gates 
such as “AND ”,”OR” are used to show the relationship among events at the same 
level. Logical “AND” gate is used when two or more events need in combination to 
cause the next higher event; Logical “OR” gate is used when any of two or more 
events may occur to cause the next higher event (IMO, 1997). 
 
According to the US Coast Guard (2001), the procedure of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
is as follows: 
 
• Define the system of interest. 
• Define the TOP event for analysis. 
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• Define the treetop structure; specify the events that most directly lead to the 
TOP events. 
• Explore each branch in successive levels. 
• Identify the combinations of events contributing to the TOP event. 
• Identify important dependent failure potentials and adjust the model 
appropriately. 
• Perform quantitative analysis to predict the risk level. 
 
Figure 4.4 is an example of fault tree:  
 
Figure 4.4: fault tree 
Source: (USCG, 2001) 
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FTA can be conducted qualitatively or quantitatively. Qualitatively the relationship 
among events is illustrated; quantitatively the risk level and the relative importance 
of various events can be calculated. FTA is able to analyse common cause failures 
and failures caused by events in combination. It is effective to be used to analyse 
the root causes of specific accidents with relatively complex combinations of events. 
As to a complex system FTA can help the better understanding of it. 
 
FTA is a technique with narrow focus; it only examines one specific accident of 
interest. More fault trees should be developed in order to analyse other types of 
accidents. The quantification of analysis requires significant expertise and reliable 
statistical data (USCG, 2001; Kuo, 1998). 
 
4.10. Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
 
Event Tree Analysis is a technique, which by means of tree structure, visually 
models the possible outcomes of an initiating event. “The model illustrates how 
safeguards and external influences, called lines of assurance, affect the path of 
accident chains” (USCG, 2001). The probability of success or failure of each 
safeguard action is analyzed along each path; the multiplication of them by the 
probability of the initiating event gives the probability of each consequence.  
 
According to the US Coast Guard (2001), the procedure of Event Tree Analysis is as 
follows: 
 
• Define the system of interest 
• Identify the initiating event of interest 
• Identify lines of assurance—the safeguards that help to mitigate the 
consequence of the initiating event 
• Define accident scenarios and construct the event tree logic 
• Analyze accident sequence outcomes—the frequency and consequence of 
outcomes 
• Summarize results in the table or graphic (F-N Curve) for evaluation and 
decision-making 
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Figure 4.5 below is an example of event tree: 
 
Figure 4.5:  event tree   
Source: (USCG, 2001) 
 
ETA is applicable for almost any kind of system. It is very effective to model 
accidents for the system with multiple safeguards and to determine the 
consequence resulted from various initiating events. It is able to account for timing, 
dependence, and domino effects among various events. Qualitatively it shows the 
development path of accidents from the initiating events. Quantitatively it presents 
the frequency, consequence of various sequence, and the relative importance of 
various sequence and contributing events. 
 
However the scope of ETA is limited to only one initiating event, it is not effective to 
be used to identify all causes that can result in accidents. The subtle dependency 
 44
among various lines of assurance could be easily overlooked, which may present 
certain uncertainty in the analysis (USCG, 2001). 
 
4.11. Cause-Consequence Analysis 
 
“Cause-Consequence Analysis is a technique to explore time-sequenced system 
responses to initiating “challenges” and enables probability assessment of 
success/failure outcomes at staged increments” (Clemens, 1992).  It is sometimes 
called as “expanded” Event Tree Analysis, or a combination of Fault Tree Analysis 
and Event Tree Analysis. 
 
Cause-consequence Analysis is a two-part technique: cause part that is analysed by 
Fault Tree Analysis, and consequence part that is evaluated by Event Tree Analysis  
(Clemens, 1992). Therefore Cause-consequence Analysis has the same 
advantages as FTA and ETA, and shares the same disadvantages with FTA and 
ETA, which is that Cause-consequence Analysis focus on only one single 
“challenge”. 
 
The following is an example of the diagram of Cause-consequence Analysis: 
 
Figure 4.6: Cause-consequence Analysis Source: (Clemens, 1992) 
 45
4.12. Management Oversight and Risk Tree Analysis (MORTA) 
 
MORTA is a comprehensive analytical tree technique for identifying the potential 
oversights / omissions and management deficiencies in a project activity. MORTA is 
based on the theory that losses are from two sources: a) specific job oversight and 
omissions, b) the management system that controls the job. MORTA can be 
regarded as a very detailed graphical checklist, where the factors involved in the 
accident are arranged in a logical tree structure (generic tree) and accompanied by 
evaluating criteria (generic questions).  
 
The general procedure is to go through the checklist along the defined generic tree 
structure, answer the generic questions associated with each item in the checklist, 
evaluate it with factual data and colour-code it accordingly. Four colours are used to 
represent different significance of the event: 
 
• Red: The event is less than adequate (LTA) 
• Green:  The event is satisfactory and adequate 
• Blue:  The event has insufficient evidence or information to evaluate 
• Black:  The event is not applicable or relevant to the accident 
 
Finally the path of cause and effect can be traced back by going through the events 
with red colour (Jeffcott, 2001; DOE, 2001) Figure 4.7 below is a MORTA chart 
displaying the injury, damage, other costs, performance lost, or degraded event: 
 
Among the advantages of MORTA is that it is very systematic, comprehensive, and 
very effective in the analysis and investigation of accidents and events. It dissects 
an accident systematically, and can serve as a “road map” to guide the investigator 
through all possible factors. The scope of MORTA goes beyond the immediate 
causes of an accident by scrutinizing the management systems closely and human 
factors. MORTA reflects the multi-factorial nature of accidents and is able to 
evaluate simultaneously multiple accident causes through the tree structure (DOE, 
2001). 
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Figure 4.7: MORTA chart displaying the injury, damage, other costs, performance 
lost, or degraded event. 
Source: (DOE, 2001) 
 
Among its main disadvantages is MORTA’s complexity. Professional MORTA 
analysts are needed to conduct MORTA effectively. Also it is not appropriate to 
analyse relatively simple accidents (Jeffcott, 2001). There are some simplified 
techniques that apply the principle of MORTA, such as Project Evaluation Tree (PET) 
Analysis, and Safety management Organization Review Technique (SMORT), which 
can be used in a simple and convenient manner for simple accidents (DOE, 2001). 
 
4.13. Techniques for analysis of dynamic systems 
 
Dynamic system is the system whose state is evolving over time. Traditional risk 
assessment techniques are developed to analyse static systems where the time-
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dependency factor of the system is not considered, so these methods meet difficulty 
when addressing dynamic scenarios. In a dynamic system, the system evolves 
dynamically and operators decisions, actions, failures and controls can influence the 
dynamics; reciprocally, the dynamics of the system affects operators decisions, 
actions, failures and controls. Therefore there is a dynamic interaction between the 
system and the operational decisions, actions, control, failures. Methods to analyse 
dynamic systems are developed, such as Markov modelling, dynamic event logic 
analytical methodology, dynamic event tree analysis method, digraph/fault graph, 
GO method, and so on. There are, however, still certain drawbacks related with 
these dynamic analysing methods, especially the requirement for large amount of 
computer resources and extensive data collection. With the development of powerful 
computers and the improvement on methodology, such dynamic analysing methods 
would be widely applied to overcome problems faced by traditional methods (UMD, 
2001). 
 
4.14. Relative Ranking / Risk Indexing / Rating system 
 
“The Relative Ranking / risk indexing technique assesses the attributes of a vessel, 
shore facility, or operation to calculate index numbers” (USCG, 2001). It provides 
index numbers for relative risk comparison among various alternatives, systems, so 
that the priority is established to facilitate decision-making process. 
 
The general procedure of Relative Ranking / Risk Index is the following: (USCG, 
2001) 
• Define the scope of the study 
• Select the ranking tool that will be used 
• Collect scoring information 
• Calculate ranking indexes 
 
The ranking tool is very important to the quality of evaluation; the development of a 
ranking tool requires substantial experience and knowledge. The core of such tools 
is to select suitable factors to assess, and to determine the relevant importance of 
these factors to system performance (USCG, 2001). 
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This technique is effective to make relative comparison, however the score or index 
resulted could not provide information about the absolute risk level.  Each ranking 
tool normally focuses on a specific type of risk or system. To assess the risk or 
system outside the scope of that tool, new tools have to be developed (USCG, 
2001). 
 
4.15. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) 
 
At the initial stage of development of the risk-based approach, risk analysts have 
been solely focusing on technical systems --- hardware.  Eventually people realized 
that “the human element is one of the most important contributory aspects to the 
causation and avoidance of accidents” (IMO, 2001). Therefore efforts were made to 
incorporate human elements into the process of risk-based approach through the 
use of human reliability analysis (HRA). This section will describe the general 
procedure of HRA, introduce and evaluate the most commonly used HRA 
techniques, and discuss the limitations of HRA at this developing stage.  
 
The general procedure of HRA is the following: (IMO, 1997) 
• Identification of key tasks by performing the high-level task analysis, and 
associated human related hazards 
• Detailed task analysis of key tasks to identify critical subtasks and 
associated human related hazards 
• Identification of human error 
• Analysis of human error, including causes, error-recovery, consequence 
• Quantification of human Error Probabilities (HEPs) 
 
For the purpose of integration, the result of each step of the HRA should be fit into 
the corresponding step of the risk assessment. If a quantitative risk assessment is 
required, the quantitative value of HEPs should be fit into the risk assessment 
procedure. However, considering the complexity of the techniques and availability of 
data, it is sufficient to conduct a qualitative HRA analysis, especially at the early 
stage of the risk assessment, since it can provide a clear indication of critical areas 
that should be chosen for analysis (IMO, 1997). 
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The HRA techniques that will be discussed in this section are as follows: 
• Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) 
• Absolute Probability Judgement (APJ) 
• Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) 
• Paired Comparison (PC) 
• Success Likelihood Index Method Using Multi Attribute Utility Decomposition 
(SLIM-MAUD) 
 
4.15.1. Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) 
 
THERP is both a HRA technique and a human error databank. It is “a 
comprehensive methodology covering task analysis, human error identification, 
human error modelling and human error quantification” (IMO, 2001). The general 
procedure of THERP is as follows: (IMO, 2001) 
• Identify all the systems that are influenced and affected by human operations; 
• Perform task analysis in order to identify all human operations that affect the 
system; 
• Determine the Human Error Probability (HEP) through the database and 
expert judgement; 
• Determine the consequence of human errors by incorporating the human 
error into the risk modelling procedure. 
 
For the purpose of task decomposition and subsequent error quantification, the 
“HRA event tree” is established to model the logical and time-dependent correlations 
between the individual success and failure event. Figure 4.8 below is an example of 
the “HRA event tree”. 
 
The general principle of determining HEPs is that, first the nominal error probability 
(NHEP) is checked from the database, and then the NHEP is adapted or modified to 
the actual situation. Sets of Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) are used in 
THERP for this adaptation, which have reliability-decreasing or –increasing effect 
and “include experience, situational stress factors, work environment, individual 
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motivation, and the human-machine interface“ (IMO, 2001). The HEP is calculated 
through the following formula: (NEA, 1998) 
HEP = NHEP · PSF 1 · PSF 2 ..., 
 
 
Figure 4.8: THERP event tree modelling for the failure of the task of changing from 
feed to circulation mode as soon as the alarm warns of an excessively low water 
level in the refuelling water storage tank (RWST) during a large loss-of-coolant 
accident. 
Source: (NEA, 1998) 
 
To assess the probability of diagnosis failure, the time-reliability correlation model is 
used; the probability of diagnosis failure is defined as a function of the time available 
for diagnosis. The education- and training-related knowledge level is considered 
here, since “the better the knowledge about the accident to be analysed, the faster a 
correct diagnosis is to be expected” (NEA, 1998). 
 
4.15.2. Absolute Probability Judgement (APJ) 
 
“APJ refers to a group of techniques that utilises expert judgement to develop 
human error probabilities (HEPs)” (IMO, 1997). This technique is used in situation 
where relevant data is not available and direct numerical estimation is the only way 
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possible to obtain the HEPs. Typical techniques are the Delphi technique, the 
Nominal Group Technique, and so on (IMO, 1997). 
 
4.15.3. Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) 
 
HEART is a relatively simple and quick technique to develop HEPs. This technique 
is based on a database with nine generic task descriptions and associated human 
error probabilities (IMO, 1997). The general principle is similar with THERP. Firstly 
the analyst matches the assessed task to the generic task description and finds the 
generic HEP, then adapts or modifies the generic HEP according to characteristics 
of the identified Error Producing Conditions (EPCs), Similar to PSFs in THERP, the 
EPC multiplier is utilised to increase the order of magnitude of the HEP 
measurement (Kirwan, 1988). 
 
4.15.4. Paired Comparison (PC) 
 
Paired Comparison can be regarded as “a significant, expert judgement technique” 
(IMO, 2001) and a method of relative ranking of human errors. Paired Comparison 
requests experts to make a series of simple judgement between pairs of human 
error descriptions and decide which error is more probable in each pair. For ‘n’ 
errors, each expert makes n(n-1)/2 comparisons. Then the relative scaling of error 
likelihood of all errors can be established based on the combination of the 
comparisons from all different experts. Finally the HEP is derived by using 
calibration on condition that there shall be at least two error with known HEPs 
(Kirwan, 1988). 
 
4.15.5. Success Likelihood Index Method Using Multi Attribute Utility 
Decomposition (SLIM-MAUD) 
 
SLIM-MAUD is a computerised technique and is a method of relative ranking of 
human errors. MAUD is an approach to ensure that the expert group conducts the 
study without being affected by their biases. The basic assumption of SLIM-MAUD 
is that relative likelihood of human error can be defined as a function of various 
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Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs). A relative scale, called Success Likelihood 
Index (SLI), is established by SLIM-MAUD to represent the relative likelihood of 
human error, then this index can be calibrated to develop the human error 
probability (Kirwan, 1988). 
 
4.15.6. Evaluation of HRA techniques 
 
The human reliability analysis techniques could be evaluated against the following 
criteria in table 4.4: 
 
Table 4.4: HRA techniques evaluation criteria 
Source: based upon (Humphreys, 1988) 
Accuracy Validity Usefulness 
• Numerical 
• Consistency 
• Modelling 
• Theoretical 
• Perceived 
• Comparative 
• Qualitative 
• Sensitivity analysis 
capability 
• Breadth of applicability 
• Comprehensiveness 
Effective use of 
resources 
Acceptability Maturity 
• Equipment and 
personnel 
• Data requirements 
• Resource limitations 
• Degree of 
decomposition 
• Training requirements 
• To regulatory bodies
• To the scientific 
community 
• To assessors 
• Auditability 
• Expert review 
• Current 
• Development 
potential 
 
In order to aid the selection of the technique to perform analysis, “The Human 
Reliability Assessors Guide 1” provides an comparative evaluation of the above 
mentioned HRA techniques, which is summarized in the table below:  
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Table 4.5: Summary of evaluations of HRA techniques 
Source: (Humphreys, 1988) 
 THERP APJ HEART PC SLIM 
Accuracy Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Validity Moderate Moderate/ 
high 
Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Usefulness Moderate Moderate/ 
high 
High Low/ 
Moderate 
High 
Effective use 
of resources 
Low/ 
Moderate 
Moderate High Low/ 
Moderate 
Low/ 
Moderate 
Acceptability High Moderate (Moderate) Moderate/ 
high 
Moderate/ 
high 
Maturity High High Low/ 
Moderate 
Moderate Moderate/ 
high 
 
4.15.7. The limitation of current HRA techniques 
 
Before proceeding to the discussion of the limitation, it is necessary to understand 
the two classes of human errors applied in HRA: errors of omission and errors of 
commission. “Errors of omission refer to the failure to perform an action required in 
response to a situation (a part of a scenario). Errors of commission consist of the 
execution of actions inappropriate for the given situation,” which is closely related 
with decision errors (NEA, 1998). The main limitation of the currently available HRA 
techniques is that they are not suitable to address errors of commission; 
comparatively they handle errors of omission better. The current HRA techniques 
are “not generally based on an empirically supported model of human behaviour, 
and especially, of the cognitive behaviour of operators“ (NEA, 1998). With such 
weak basis they failed to consider broadly the cognitive state of the operator and its 
evolution. Lack of sufficient data on operator performance is one important 
contributing factor to this deficiency. In addition some other limitations are as follows: 
(NEA, 1998) 
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• Significant differences in quantitative results from different analysts (using 
the same method) or from different methods. 
• Weak treatment of dependencies between actions. 
• Weak treatment of diagnosis. 
• Lack of treatment of dependencies between Performance Shaping Factors 
(PSFs). 
 
Due to such limitations mentioned above, the research and development is driven in 
a wide range of areas, such as new HRA methods, data collection and analysis, 
organizational factors and safety culture, the dynamic approach to treat errors of 
commission, and so on (NEA, 1998). 
 
4.16. Generalization of the techniques of the risk-based approach 
 
Each technique has various attributes, this section will explore the basic attributes of 
these techniques, group them according to their attributes, and present a 
comprehensive map illustrating the relationship among all these techniques. 
 
4.16.1. Deductive – Inductive 
 
Deductive or inductive refers to the logic procedure according to which the 
technique is conducted. The distinction between deductive and inductive procedures 
can be clearly illustrated by figure 4.9. 
 
Event Tree Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis are very typical deductive techniques, 
in that FTA starts from the single top event and goes down to various contributing 
factors at lower levels; ETA starts from the single initiating event and goes up to 
various sequences at higher levels. As a combination of ETA and FTA, Cause-
Consequence Analysis is also a deductive technique since it starts from the single 
initiating challenge and goes downwards to contributing factors like FTA, and 
upwards to various consequences like ETA. 
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Figure 4.9: Deductive procedure and inductive procedure of risk assessment  
 
FMEA, or FMECA is a typical inductive procedure, in that it starts from determining 
the failure modes of all components at the lowest level, then goes upwards to 
determine the effects of the failure modes at higher levels, and identify the failure 
modes at higher levels. Working in the similar principle PHA, HAZOP are also 
inductive techniques. 
 
4.16.2. Structure 
 
Structure is an important attribute concerning how the technique is structured. It is 
not difficult to see that some techniques discussed above are loosely structured like 
Brainstorming; some are highly structured like FMEA.  Generally there are two ways 
to structure the technique: “system structure” and “tree structure”. 
 
The techniques with “system structure” normally start with the subdivision of the 
system of interest. The system is subdivided into various subsystems, assemblies, 
and components, the level of details depends on the actual requirement. The 
structure can be illustrated by block diagrams, flow charts, and so on. Then by 
following and going through the system structure, each component, assembly, or 
subsystem is considered and analysed, therefore the probability of certain 
Starting-points 
Inductive procedures 
Starting-point
Deductive procedures 
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subsystem or component being neglected is very low. FMEA, PHA, HAZOP, and 
What-If (if conducted in a similar manner) can be classified as techniques with 
“system structure”. 
 
For techniques with “tree structure”, the basis of the analysis is the tree by which the 
logical relations among various factors are illustrated. Therefore the first task to 
conduct such techniques is to develop the tree like in FTA, ETA, or Cause-
Consequence Analysis, or choose a proper prepared tree like in MORTA. Then the 
analysis is conducted by going through all the factors in the tree. 
 
Checklist is a structured technique; its structure is fully determined by the developer 
of the checklist, it could be a “system structure”, or a “tree structure” like MORTA —
a graphic checklist. 
 
4.16.3. Scope 
 
The scope of the technique is an issue related with the structure of the technique, 
and the deductive or inductive nature of the technique. It is obvious that the scope of 
the inductive techniques with “system structure” is the whole system. For the 
deductive techniques with “tree structure”, the scope is only the single initiating 
event, for example an accident. 
 
4.16.4. Focuses of techniques 
 
Although all the techniques discussed above are called techniques of the risk-based 
approach, not all of them could cover the whole procedure of the risk-based 
approach, each technique has its specific focus aiming at handling certain part of 
the whole procedure of the risk-based approach. 
 
Some techniques are more specialized at the part of hazard identification, although 
different names for “hazard” are used in these techniques, such as HAZOP, PHA, 
FMEA, What-If, Checklist, physical inspection, and Brainstorming. Although these 
techniques contain procedures like determining the causes and consequences of 
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hazards, failures or accidents, they don’t provide specific technique for those 
procedures, direct expert judgement is normally utilized. 
 
Some techniques focus on determining the causal factors. Fault Tree Analysis 
focuses on the identification of the causal factors of the accident, thereby 
establishing the probability of the accident. MORTA focuses on identifying omission 
/ oversight and management deficiencies, and the causal chain. Techniques like 
Event Tree Analysis focuses on the identification of the scenario and various 
possible consequences of the accident, and determining the severity of the 
consequence. Some techniques directly focus on the estimation of the risk level, 
such as Criticality Analysis. Relative Ranking / Risk Indexing focuses on the relative 
estimation of the risk level. 
 
The above discussions on the basic attributes of techniques can be roughly 
illustrated by the following Figure 4.10. This figure is drawn to reflect the basic 
particulars of these techniques, it should not be construed as the comprehensive 
representation of these techniques. 
 
This chapter discussed various scientific techniques that are commonly used in the 
risk-based approach, and analysed their strengths and limitations. The attributes of 
these techniques were identified and generalized, thus the relationship among these 
techniques is established under the framework of the risk-based approach. As the 
major general methodological issues, the procedure and techniques, as well as their 
interactions, have been settled down, this dissertation will move on to discuss the 
risk-based approach under the context of maritime safety. 
 58
 
Figure 4.10:  General positioning of techniques of risk-based approach 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Risk-based approach to maritime safety 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
In previous chapters, the general processes of the risk-based approach and 
various techniques have been discussed. This chapter will look at how this 
approach can be properly applied to maritime safety. The characteristics of 
maritime industry will be analyzed as well as the implications to the 
application; two methodological issues, the practical procedure and the 
selection of techniques, will be discussed. A model case of risk assessment 
of a generic ship will be presented as an example to show in depth how the 
risk-based approach can be applied to ships.  An ideal application scheme 
will be provided to show at macro level how the risk-based approach will be 
applied to the maritime industry. 
 
5.2. Characteristics of maritime safety 
 
The risk-based approach originated from the land-based industries like nuclear 
industry, chemical plant, which are very different with the maritime industry from 
various aspects. Therefore the special characteristics of the maritime industry must 
be carefully considered and taken into account when the risk-based approach is 
applied. The following identifies several basic characteristics of the maritime industry; 
it is only for the purpose of illustrating the difference with other land-based industries, 
not necessarily a comprehensive comparison of it. 
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The core of the maritime industry is the ship. The basic characteristic of ships is that 
ships are floating systems; ships therefore have to maintain floatability, watertight 
integrity and stability (intact and damage), which are the basic requirements for the 
survival of ships. Ships also have to employ special ways of propulsion, steering and 
maneuver. Different ways of lifesaving, evacuation, search and rescue have to be 
introduced considering the fact that an accident could happen to a ship that is 
floating somewhere in the ocean with violent sea conditions and cold seawater. 
 
The hardware of a ship is a very complex self-sustaining system, which is 
sometimes compared to a “floating city”. The basis of the system is the hull of the 
ship, which provides floatability and strength for the whole system. Various 
subsystems serving for different purposes are accommodated in the limited space 
provided by the hull, such as living quarters for crew, passenger cabins, cargo holds, 
propulsion, steering, main engines, generators, navigation equipment, cargo 
handling equipment, fire fighting equipment, and so on. In addition, since so many 
subsystems are sharing such a limited space, if accidents occur to some 
subsystems, other subsystems would be very easily affected. For example, fire can 
spread very quickly in the absence of any control measures. 
 
The maritime industry is highly affected by human factors in different ways. It is 
because of human beings that the ship has possibility to navigate, and it is also 
because of human beings that most of the accidents occur. Seafarers operate the 
ship in a highly interactive way. It is common sense that the navigation of ships 
requires highly skilled seafarers, because it involves complex decision-making 
processes, and the execution of decisions. Although ships nowadays are much 
more automated than before, the key role of human beings in safety is not 
decreasing. On the contrary, with the increase of hardware reliability, the human 
factor has become even more significant to maritime safety. Looking at the 
operational level, human factors involve various aspects, such as fatigue, multi-
nationalities of crew, cultural differences, language and associated communication 
difficulties, influences from the motion of the sea, extended periods of separation 
from family, boring life with long time at sea, pure “male world” onboard ships, and 
so on. Looking at management level, however, shipping companies are organized 
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and operated in various flexible ways for the purpose of economy, not for the 
concern of safety. To the same ship, there might be owners, operators, and various 
types of charterers, who are scattered around the whole world, and with complex 
relationships and unclearly defined responsibilities for safety. The master of the ship, 
which can be regarded as the connection between the land-based management and 
the shipboard management, is a key feature of shipping that is very different with 
other land-based industries. 
 
Ships are more heavily affected by external environmental factors than land-based 
industries. The most typical factors are weather conditions, sea conditions, 
navigation channels, other ships, and so on. Nowadays ships are becoming larger in 
size and faster in speed, and the influence of external environmental factors to ships 
will be more significant. 
 
5.3. The implication of maritime characteristics to the application of the 
risk-based approach 
 
The characteristics of the maritime industry have to be taken into account when 
applying the risk-based approach, compared with land-based industries, attention 
should be given to the following aspects that implied by the maritime characteristics: 
 
• New areas of analysis will arise, and accordingly the hazards specific to 
maritime industry will arise, which are totally unexpected in land-based 
industries, such as hazard to hull integrity, hazard from the sea condition, 
and so on. 
• New causes and consequences of accidents specific to maritime industry will 
arise, for example the consequence to stability, the causes from marine 
environment. 
• Different ways of implementing risk techniques will be adopted to cope with 
maritime characteristics. For example, maritime safety is very heavily 
involved with human factors in different ways, implying that not only new 
hazards will arise, but also different ways of integrating human factors into 
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the risk assessment have to be carefully considered and established in order 
to fully reflect maritime characteristics. 
 
5.4. Two methodological issues in the practical application of the risk-
based approach 
 
Two aspects should be considered in the application of the risk-based approach, 
one is the practical procedure of the application; the other is the selection of suitable 
techniques to apply for the application. 
 
5.4.1. Adaptation of the general procedure of the risk-based approach 
 
The procedure of the risk-based approach discussed in Chapter 3 is generalized 
result from various typical applications, which reflects the basic principle of the risk-
based approach. In the practical application, the actual procedure to be followed will 
be decided by the actual situation, and under the guidance of the general procedure 
of the risk-based approach. Since the risk-based approach is a very flexible tool, it 
can be well adapted to suit various situations and needs in different ways, forms, 
and be conducted in different procedures. Whatever procedures being adopted, risk 
assessment is always the basic step that should not be neglected. 
 
Generally, when the risk-based approach is applied for the purpose of seeking 
safety solutions, the complete procedure will roughly be followed. For example, the 
shipping company applies Safety Case to look for cost-effective measures for safety 
improvement, or applies Risk-Centered-Maintenance to seek the optimized 
maintenance scheme; the Administrations and classification societies apply Formal 
Safety Assessment to develop rules and regulations. More discussions about Safety 
Case, Risk-Centered-Maintenance and Formal Safety Assessment can be found in 
Section 5.6 and the Appendix. 
 
When the risk-based approach is applied for evaluation purposes, maybe only risk 
assessment step is conducted. For example, the Administrations assess the risk of 
ships in order to set the inspection priority, the decision is made only upon the risk 
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assessment, although steps like risk control measures and the cost effectiveness 
assessment are not conducted, they are in fact hiding in the philosophy of the 
application in that the inspection can be regarded as a risk control measure, and to 
inspect according to the priority is the cost-effective way to use inspection resources. 
 
5.4.2. The principle of choosing appropriate techniques for the application 
 
Chapter 4 discussed various risk assessment techniques; it is obvious that one 
technique could not satisfy all of the requirements of an application. It is more 
advisable to employ a combination of techniques and use the advantages of them. 
The following are some factors that should be taken into account in choosing 
suitable techniques for the application: (USCG, 2001) 
 
• Reason for the application: The reason behind the application and the 
purpose shall be clearly defined and understood. 
• Type of result needed: The result that is expected from the application is an 
important factor since various techniques are capable of producing different 
results. The result might be a list of ranked items for decision-making, causal 
factors and mechanism of accidents or failure, quantitative or qualitative risk 
level, risk control measures, and so on. 
• Type of resources available: Since the various techniques have different 
demands on the resources, the resource available would affect the choosing 
of techniques. On the other hand the chosen technique would determine 
further resources needed, in case the current resources are not sufficient. 
• Complexity and size of the application: The complexity and size of the 
application is dependent on the complexity of the system concerned and the 
level of detail needed. Some techniques are not capable of dealing with 
complex applications; therefore other techniques with such capability shall 
be used. 
• Type of system, operation or accident: Some techniques are more suitable to 
analyze certain system than others, therefore the technique that is good at 
analyzing the system concerned shall be chosen and used. For example, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, HAZOP is good at analyzing system with certain 
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“flow”, Event Tree Analysis is good at analyzing the consequence 
development of accidents. 
 
In short, a good understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of various 
techniques, and a clear understanding of the application, will help to choose the 
suitable techniques.  
 
5.5. A model case of risk assessment of a generic ship 
 
The core of the maritime industry is the ship, and the risk assessment of ships is the 
core and base case of the risk-based approach to maritime safety, therefore a 
reliable risk assessment of ships is very essential and important. This section will 
present a model case of risk assessment of a generic ship in order to show how a 
combination of techniques should be applied to ships by taking account into 
maritime characteristics. This model can be used as a basis for risk assessment of 
specific ships. 
 
This model is based on the following assumptions: 
• The ship is a general cargo ship at the operation stage. 
• The purpose of risk assessment is for the preparation of a Safety Case. 
• The result needed is a list of prioritized hazards, causal factors and 
sequence of accidents, and the quantified risk level. 
• Resources available are drawings, statistical data on casualty, failure, near 
miss, and so on. 
 
5.5.1. Definition of ship model 
 
The first step of risk assessment is to define and understand the system to be 
analyzed. As discussed in chapter 1, safety is determined by engineering, operation, 
management and the environment. By taking into account this principle and the 
characteristics of generic ships, this section will present a ship model by using the 
following figures: 
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Figure 5.1: The component levels of the generic model of ships 
Source: Formal safety assessment of containerships (Wang & Foinikis, 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: The generic engineering and technical system 
Source: Formal safety assessment of containerships (Wang & Foinikis, 2000) 
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Figure 5.3: Personnel subsystem 
Source: Formal safety assessment of containerships (Wang & Foinikis, 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Organizational / managerial infrastructure 
Source: Formal safety assessment of containerships (Wang & Foinikis, 2000) 
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Figure 5.5: The generic environment of operation 
Source: Formal safety assessment of containerships (Wang & Foinikis, 2000) 
 
5.5.2. Hazard identification 
 
Various techniques for hazard identification are available, to assure the 
completeness of the hazard identification, the techniques with “system structure” as 
discussed in chapter 4 should be considered, such as PHA, HAZOP, FMEA. Since 
this model ship is at operational stage, HAZOP and FMEA are adopted as the main 
techniques for this step, of course other techniques will be used as well for certain 
systems or certain purposes. Since risk assessment is a group work, brainstorming 
technique is always integrated in the whole procedure as a means of applying other 
techniques. In hazard identification all operational modes of the ship should be 
considered: (Wang, 2000) 
• Entering and leaving port 
• Berthing and unberthing 
• Cargo and ballast operations 
• Coastal navigation 
• Open sea navigation 
• Planned maintenance (day-to-day onboard) 
• Major maintenance (dry docking) 
 
To ensure the completeness of hazard identification, hazards should be explored in 
all subsystems: the engineering & technical system, the personnel subsystem, the 
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organizational / managerial infrastructure and the operational environment. The 
underlying hazards or causal factors existed in the organizational / managerial 
infrastructure and the operational environment (related with commercial, political) 
cannot be easily identified, however, they will be explored in the risk analysis step. 
Therefore this step focuses on the engineering & technical system, the personnel 
subsystem and the operational environment (related with nature, port, other ships), 
in short, the hardware, the associated operations of the hardware and the natural 
environment of ships. 
 
The identification of human related hazards should be conducted at the same time 
when the hardware is analyzed. For each subsystem in the engineering & technical 
system, the analysis of hardware and the task analysis of operations associated with 
that hardware should proceed together, like two parallel lines, the interaction and 
interface should be examined carefully. This can be illustrated by figure 5.6 as 
proposed by the author: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: The integration of hardware analysis and task analysis (By the author) 
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- Tunnels 
- Upper Deck Areas 
- Crew Accommodation 
- Galley 
- Provisions' Storage Spaces (including Bonded Stores) 
 
To each subsystem of the hardware of the ship, suitable techniques should be 
selected according to its characteristics.  The following is the suggested technique 
for different engineering subsystems: 
 
HAZOP: for systems with continuous process, such as hydraulic systems, 
compressed air systems, fuel supply systems, ballast water systems. 
FMEA: for mechanical systems and electrical systems, such as the main engine, 
generators, motors, electrical equipment. 
Structured What-if technique or checklist: for other system not suitable for HAZOP 
and FMEA, such as hull, structure. 
 
Take compressed air system for starting the ship’s main engine as an example, this 
system is suitable to be analyzed by HAZOP: the objective of the compressed air 
system is to provide compressed air to start main engine. “Pressure” is an important 
property of this sub-system. By applying guidewords to the property --- “pressure” of 
the compress air system, possible deviations are generated, such as “No pressure”, 
“More pressure”, “Less pressure”, and so on.  Then the causes, consequences and 
mitigating actions will be analyzed for each deviation. Repeat the same procedure to 
all the properties of the sub-system, the comprehensive list of hazards in the 
compressed air sub-system and their causes, consequences and mitigating actions 
will be generated. 
 
To the operations of the hardware, such as ship maneuvering, navigation, cargo 
handling, hazard identification should start from task analysis, which is the first step 
of Human Reliability Analysis, and then to each subtask, the following methods can 
be applied to identify hazards: 
• Use guidewords to subtask like HAZOP 
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• Identify failure of performance like FMEA 
• Ask What-if questions 
• Checklist 
 
Since the natural environment is not a structured system, the Brainstorming 
approach is a suitable solution for the hazard identification. Firstly it is necessary to 
list all natural environment factors by using brainstorming approach, and then to ask 
What-if questions to each factor, thereby identifying possible hazards associated 
with it. This can be conducted either separately or along with the hazard 
identification of hardware and operation. When it is conducted along with the hazard 
identification of hardware and operation, the same principle applies, firstly, identify 
the environmental factors that could affect each hardware or operations, such as 
hull, lifeboat launching, and then What-if questions will be asked to the 
environmental factors to generate the hazard list. 
 
For each hazard identified, the causes, consequences should be analyzed and a 
semi-quantitative criticality analysis be conducted for the purpose of prioritization. 
Risk matrix can be applied for the criticality analysis. Risk matrix is a method to 
represent frequency, consequence and risk by using indices. The process is to 
assign indices to frequency and consequence, then the combination of frequency 
index and consequence index presents the risk index (IMO, 2000). The index can be 
determined according to table 5.1, 5.2, 5.3. Table 5.4 is an example of the outcome 
of hazard identification. 
 
Table 5.1: Consequence Index  
(Source: IMO MSC 72/16) 
Consequence Index 
SI SEVERITY EFFECTS ON HUMAN SAFETY EFFECTS ON SHIP S 
(Equivalent fatalities) 
1 Minor Single or minor injuries Local equipment 
damage 
0.01 
2 Significant Multiple or severe injuries Non-severe ship 
damage 
0.1 
3 Severe Single fatality or multiple severe injuries Severe damage 1 
4 Catastrophic Multiple fatalities Total loss 10 
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Table 5.2: Frequency Index (Source: IMO MSC 72/16) 
Frequency Index 
FI FREQUENCY DEFINITION 
EFFECTS ON SHIP 
F 
(per ship year) 
7 Frequent Likely to occur once per month on one ship 10 
5 Reasonably probable Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 10 ships, i.e. 
likely to occur a few times during the ship’s life 
0.1 
3 Remote Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 1000 ships, i.e. 
likely to occur in the total life of several similar ships 
10-3 
1 Extremely remote Likely to occur once in 10 year in a fleet of 1000 ships 10-5 
 
Table 5.3: Risk matrix (Source: IMO MSC 72/16) 
Risk matrix 
Severity 
FI Frequency 
1 2 3 4 
  Minor Significant Severe Catastrophic 
7 Frequent 8 9 10 11 
6  7 8 9 10 
5 Reasonably probable 6 7 8 9 
4  5 6 7 8 
3 Remote 4 5 6 7 
2  3 4 5 6 
1 Extremely remote 2 3 4 5 
 
Table 5.4: Examples of hazard list (IMO, MSC 74/INF.5/Add.1) 
Hazard Effect Cause Suggested 
hazard 
frequency 
Worst 
credible 
consequence 
Suggested 
screening 
band 
Poor wheelhouse 
visibility due to 
general low height 
of bridge structure 
Encountered vessels 
cannot be observed 
easily.  
Potential for deck 
cargo to create 
blindspot.  
Increased collision 
potential. 
Design compromise 
to allow transit under 
low bridges 
5 1 6 
Ability to 
maneuver limited, 
especially in close 
quarters situations 
at reduced speed. 
Increased collision 
potential during port 
entry or exit. 
Propulsion power to 
weight ratio of bulk 
carriers reducing. 
High windage when 
light ship. 
4 2 6 
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5.5.3. Risk analysis 
 
According to the prioritization, those hazards of minor significance are discarded 
from consideration of continuous analysis. Each significant hazard will be examined 
more deeply and in more detail with regard to the connection and dependency 
among hazards, causal factors, and the accident scenario. Therefore techniques 
with “tree structure” like Fault Tree Analysis, Event Tree Analysis, and Cause 
Consequence Analysis, MORTA are suitable to be applied here in this step.  
 
The hazards generated can be very large in number and scattered; therefore it is 
meaningful to group them under accident categories according to their relevance, 
then each accident category will be analyzed by utilizing and structuring the 
information generated in hazard identification. 
 
The generic accident categories of ships include: (Wang, 2001; IMO, 1997) 
• Contact and / or Collision 
• Flooding 
• Foundered 
• Grounding and / or stranding 
• Hull damage, loss of hull integrity 
• Fire / explosion 
• Machinery damage (including electrical equipments) 
• Oil spill 
• Personal accidents 
• Cargo damage 
 
It is not convenient to apply techniques directly to the accident category, before the 
analysis, it is necessary to subdivide each accident category into subcategories 
according to certain parameters, for example, locations, operation modes. Then FTA 
is applied to each sub-category to explore the causal factors, and ETA is applied to 
develop the sequence of the accident category in order to show the final outcome of 
the accident. Figure 5.7 below is an example on accident category “fire” illustrating 
how fire accident category is subdivided, and FTA, ETA are applied to it. 
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Figure 5.7: Risk Contribution Tree for fire 
Source: Formal safety assessment of containerships (Wang & Foinikis, 2000) 
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meaning that human error is incorporated in the fault tree and event tree for each 
accident category. However, each accident category and subcategory is different in 
the degree of involvement of human factors, some accident categories and 
subcategories involve very complex operations, such as navigation of ships, 
especially under the context of the collision accident, it is very difficult to directly 
incorporate human errors into the fault tree and event tree for the collision accident. 
Therefore to such complex operations, the Human Reliability Analysis event tree 
introduced in Chapter 4.15.1 should firstly be developed as a basis for the 
development of the whole fault tree and event tree for the accident category. The 
HRA event tree will not only facilitate the understanding of the accident, but also 
facilitate the quantification of human errors.  
 
This step will continue to explore the underlying hazards or factors in the 
management / organization infrastructure and the operation environment by using 
Fault Tree Analysis. For complex matters, MORTA technique can be applied to 
identify management deficiencies. The identification of underlying factors will help to 
identify corresponding risk control measures. 
 
FTA produces the frequency of the accident sub-category, and then based on that 
ETA produces the frequency and consequence of each outcome, the combination of 
all outcomes produces the final risk level of the accident sub-category. Historical 
data will be used for the quantification process, expert judgement will be used to 
areas where data are not sufficient. Techniques could be used to assist the process 
of expert judgement, such as Delphi technique, the Nominal Group Technique, 
Brainstorming. Relative ranking technique can also be used to assist expert 
judgement in that the relative ranking of unknown probabilities can provide a basis 
for the generation of absolute value. The HRA techniques can be used to generate 
Human Error Probabilities. Table 5.5 below is an example of the distribution of risk 
among sub-categories of fire accident: 
 
The sum up of the risk level of all accident categories will produce the final risk level 
of the ship. 
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Table 5.5: Cumulative table for fire sub-categories  
Source: Formal safety assessment of containerships (Wang & Foinikis, 2000) 
ACCIDENT CATEGORY: FIRE 
Compartment 
(Sub-category) 
Potential loss of 
life (PLL) 
Frequency 
(Per vessel / year) 
Severity 
(max. observed) 
Navigation bridge 2.2E-04 1.4E-04 1 
Cargo space 6.6E-04 4.3E-04 4 
Engine room 7.7E-03 5.3E-03 3 
Void spaces 4.4E-04 2.8E-04 3 
Tunnels 4.4E-04 2.8E-04 3 
Upper deck areas 9.9E-05 6.4E-05 3 
Crew 
accommodation 
3.3E-04 2.1E-04 3 
Galley 5.5E-04 3.5E-04 2 
Provision stores 1.1E-05 7.1E-06 3 
 
5.6. An ideal scheme of application of risk assessment to maritime safety 
 
This Chapter has discussed various aspects of the application of risk-based 
approach to maritime safety; this section will present an ideal scheme of the 
application to maritime industry in order to give a comprehensive “picture” at macro 
level on how various maritime players could apply and benefit from this approach.  
Before doing that it is necessary to have a look at the main players concerning 
maritime safety, because they are the potential users of the risk-based approach. 
For the convenience of discussion, the main players can be roughly classified into 
the following groups: 
 
• Ship owners, and associated commercial stakeholders, such as ship yards, 
insurance companies, P & I Clubs, financial organizations, ship brokers, 
chaterers, and so on 
• Classification societies 
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• Governmental authorities: flag State Administrations, port State 
Administrations, environmental authorities, search & rescue organizations, 
port authorities, IMO, regional MOUs, and so on 
• Seafarers’ education and training establishments, research Institutes 
 
The starting point is the ship design stage, a Safety Case is prepared by the ship 
owner, “A “Safety Case” is a written document prepared by the operator of an 
installation, onshore or offshore, to demonstrate that major potential hazards have 
been reduced to risk levels which are as low as reasonably practicable and that they 
will be effectively managed and controlled throughout the life cycle of the 
installation” (Kuo, 1998). This Safety Case is mainly used for: 
 
• Selecting design options, and optimization of safety design 
• Seeking approval of design from the classification society, and approval of 
exemption or equivalent safety arrangement from the classification society or 
the Administration 
• Seeking financing from financing organizations 
 
At operational stage, based on the initial Safety Case, the Safety Case for the 
operation of the ship is prepared, and mainly used to: 
 
• Maintain and improve the safety management system of the shipping 
company; 
• Instruct crew training in order to better understand the system relevant to 
their specific positions, improve operation and emergency response skill; and 
• Demonstrate the safety level to stakeholders, like P & I Clubs, insurance 
companies, chaterers, customers, and governmental authorities. 
 
The Risk-centered-maintenance system is developed and maintained by the 
classification society for the shipping company.  Under the theory of Risk-centered-
maintenance, maintenance is treated as a risk control measure, and assessed by 
cost/benefit analysis in order to achieve a balanced maintenance scheme of the 
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whole system. To classification societies the information and data from RCM can 
also be used to guide the survey of the ship, and for the development of class rules. 
 
Insurance companies, P & I Clubs and charterers will develop evaluation tools to 
assess the risk of ships, and usually a relative ranking / indexing system is used. 
The data from such evaluation systems will constitute the basis for them to assess 
the risk of certain group of ships that they deal with, and to adjust policy. 
 
The rule-making process of the Administrations and classification societies will be 
assisted by Formal Safety Assessment. Formal Safety Assessment is “a structured 
and systematic methodology, aiming at enhancing maritime safety, including 
protection of life, health, the marine environment and property, by using risk and 
cost / benefit assessment“ (IMO, 1997). In the enforcement of rules and regulations, 
governmental authorities and classification societies apply their evaluation tools to 
ships, usually a relative ranking system, such as Inspection Targeting System. The 
data from such evaluation systems will provide input and constitute the basis for the 
authorities and classification societies to assess the risk of certain group of ships, 
certain areas where these ships navigate, and to develop or adjust rules, regulations 
and policy. 
 
In an ideal scheme, all people involved in maritime safety should understand the 
principle and philosophy of the risk-based approach, and apply it in daily work. The 
risk-based approach is a very flexible tool and should not be rigidly perceived only 
as a complicated process with quantitative mathematics calculations like Safety 
Case or FSA; it can also well be used in a simple, qualitative way, where the 
principle of the risk-based approach provides a systematic guidance to the logical 
thinking of people in daily work. In fact there is a close relation and interaction 
between these two ways of application: take a ship as an example, on one hand, the 
carefully prepared complicated Safety Case is a basis and provides valuable 
information to the simple, qualitative application in daily operations; on the other 
hand, the qualitative application in daily operations can produce and accumulate 
valuable inputs for the update of the Safety Case. 
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The ideal scheme is a dynamic scheme aiming at continuous improvement of safety. 
On one hand, new challenges arise, such as new technology, the changed 
environment, the established application like Safety Case should be updated to 
accommodate such changes; on the other hand, new experience and knowledge will 
improve people’s skill in the risk-based approach thereby identifying better risk 
control measures, thus improve safety performance. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Conclusion and recommendation 
 
6.1 Review 
 
Safety is perceived quality of a system under certain circumstance at a specific time, 
which is reflected by the extent to which the management, engineering and 
operation of a system is free of danger to life, property and the environment. 
Traditional approaches to safety have been successful and have contributed greatly 
to the improvement of safety throughout history. Plenty of precious experience have 
been accumulated through hard work by safety practitioners. 
 
Risk is the combination of frequency and the severity of the consequence. Risk-
based approach is the systematic process of making decisions on the bases of risk 
assessment, cost-benefit assessment, and implementation of risk control actions to 
reduce the risk to the acceptable level. As a proactive approach, the risk-based 
approach is able to further improve the safety performance in a cost-effective way, 
thereby justifying the necessity of its application to maritime safety. 
 
The risk-based approach is a systematic process, which generally consists of risk 
assessment, identification of risk reduction measures, cost benefit (effectiveness) 
assessment and recommendations for decision-making. The uncertainty is inherent 
in the process of the risk-based approach, which is a major limitation of this 
approach and affect people’s confidence in this approach. For an honest and 
convincing application of risk-based approach, the uncertainty should be identified, 
highlighted, and analyzed explicitly. “Be adequate for the needs” is the general 
principle to treat and control the uncertainty. 
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There are numerous techniques available for the risk-based approach, each of 
which has specific focus, structure, advantages and limitations. In order to use the 
capability and advantages of these techniques, this dissertation made a 
comprehensive discussion over the principle, procedure and characteristics of these 
techniques. The characteristics of each technique should be carefully examined 
when it is applied for certain purposes and certain areas.  
 
The application of the risk-based approach should take into account the 
characteristics of the maritime industry. The maritime industry has its specific 
characteristics, such as hull integrity, stability, and the complex involvement of 
human factors. To the application of the risk-based approach, such characteristics 
imply new areas of analysis, new hazards, new causes and new consequences of 
accidents, and new ways of applying risk techniques. It is obvious that one 
technique could not satisfy all requirements of the application; a combination of 
techniques might provide a satisfactory solution, for this purpose, this dissertation 
presented the principle for the selection of appropriate techniques for the application, 
and a model case of risk assessment of a generic ship to illustrate how a 
combination of techniques may be applied to a ship in practice. 
 
The risk-based approach is a powerful and flexible tool, which can be used by many 
players in the maritime industry to improve safety, such as ship owners, maritime 
Administrations, classification societies, and so on. This dissertation presented an 
ideal scheme illustrating how various players will apply and benefit from the risk-
based approach. 
 
6.2 The current situation and the future of the risk-based approach to 
maritime safety 
 
The application of the risk-based approach to maritime industry is only at the initial 
stage, the wide application is still far away. Everybody knows the word “risk”, and is 
intuitively analyzing, assessing risks in daily work; however, very few do it in a 
scientific and systematic way. 
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Shipping is an industry with great diversity, ships range from small wooden ships to 
VLCC, navigation areas range from lake, inland water to ocean globally, shipping 
companies range from “single ship company” to giant companies like MAERSK, ship 
types range from passenger ships, different cargo ships, to high speed crafts. This 
diversity implies that flexibility is needed for the application of the risk-based 
approach. On the other hand, considering the similarity existed among ships, or 
certain groups of ships, there is the possibility to develop simple tools (model case) 
as basis for the development of specific Safety Cases, so that shipping companies 
do not have to start to develop Safety Cases for its ships from the very beginning, 
thereby reducing cost and enhancing efficiency.  
 
The debate over the prescriptive approach and the risk-based approach to the 
maritime regulatory regime has been going on for years. In fact both approaches 
have advantages and disadvantages. Nevertheless, the exclusive use of 
prescriptive approach or full substitution of it with risk-based approach is not 
possible and reasonable in the future. The best way should be the combination of 
both approaches by using the capabilities of both. The combination will undergo the 
following stages depending on the degree of knowledge, skill, confidence and 
acceptance of the risk-based approach in the future: 
 
1. Prescriptive rules are applied to ships, the development and amendment of 
such rules is based on the risk-based approach. The risk-based approach is 
an input to prescriptive approach at this stage. 
2. In some areas risk-based requirements will be developed in order to 
accommodate more flexible safety arrangements. Such risk-based 
requirements will increase eventually. There are three possibilities for this: 
a. New risk-based requirements are developed. 
b. Risk-based requirements come as an alternative to certain 
prescriptive rules, and the choice is left to the users. 
c. Certain prescriptive rules will be replaced by risk-based requirements. 
3. Risk-based requirements are applied to the whole ship as an alternative to 
prescriptive rules, this will happen when people have acquired considerable 
 82
confidence in the risk-based approach and it will be applied to restricted 
groups of ships as follows: 
a. Certain ships that need more flexible arrangement and are navigating 
fully under the jurisdiction of only one Administration. 
b. Certain ships that need more flexible arrangement and are navigating 
under the jurisdiction of several Administrations, on condition that the 
regional agreement or memorandum is reached among the 
Administrations concerned. 
 
The importance of reliable data to the risk-based approach is obvious. At present 
many players in the maritime sector have databases serving for their own interests, 
however, these kinds of databases could not cope with the demands from wide 
application of the risk-based approach globally. Therefore a new global database 
might be established by an international organization like IMO, so as to ensure the 
availability and reliability of data and the effectiveness of the risk-based approach 
accordingly. 
 
6.3 Recommendations 
 
Taking into account the current situation and the future development of the risk-
based approach to maritime safety, promote its application in the maritime industry, 
the author would like to proposes the following: 
 
Firstly, the understanding of the basic concept, principle of the risk-based approach 
of all people involved in maritime safety should be promoted, this is the basis for the 
wide acceptance and application the risk-based approach. The risk-based approach 
should not be construed as something only used by scientists or high level decision-
makers, the operational people, in fact, need this knowledge most because they are 
the direct human factors affecting safety, the understanding and utilizing of such 
knowledge by them will greatly benefit the improvement of safety performance. 
 
Secondly, a unified database structure should be established. As previously 
mentioned, an international data is the best solution for the application of the risk-
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based approach to maritime safety, it seems very difficult to be realized in the near 
future. Considering the fact that many countries have their own database system for 
casualties and accidents in different structures, a unified database structure could 
be preferable solution, since a excellent unified database structure will not only 
benefit the data collection for the Administrations, classification societies, and so on, 
but also provide the potential for the data sharing in the future. 
 
Thirdly, model tools of the Safety Case should be developed. As previously 
mentioned, the similarity of ships makes it possible to develop model tools of the 
Safety Case for ships, Considering the knowledge and expertise required to develop 
the Safety Case, the model tools will greatly reduce the difficulty and enhance 
efficiency thereby reducing cost and benefiting the shipping companies, especially 
small companies. 
 
Lastly, further researches need to be made to improve the skill of risk assessment. 
As previously mentioned, the current techniques have limitations in addressing 
certain problems, for example the inability of current HRA techniques in addressing 
“errors of commission”. A ship is a very complex system that involves many different 
accidents and very complex human factors, and the application of the risk-based 
approach is at the initial stage, there are many areas that need to be investigated 
and researched. Therefore not only the risk assessment techniques need to be 
developed, but also the practical aspects of application be researched. 
 
The application of the risk-based approach to maritime safety is only at the early 
stage, there are still disputes on the feasibility and effectiveness of the application of 
this approach to maritime safety. Nevertheless, it does provide a positive direction 
towards the further improvement of safety. There is still a long way to go, it also 
needs to be improved in order to be applied appropriately to maritime safety, so that 
its value could eventually be recognized and it will gain wide acceptance and utility 
in the future. 
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Appendix: 
 
Typical examples of the application of risk-based approaches to maritime 
safety 
 
1. Safety Case 
 
The Safety Case was introduced to the UK offshore industry by the UK Health & 
Safety Executive (HSE). “A “Safety Case” is a written document prepared by the 
operator of an installation, onshore or offshore, to demonstrate that major potential 
hazards have been reduced to risk levels which are as low as reasonably 
practicable and that they will be effectively managed and controlled throughout the 
life cycle of the installation.” (Kuo, 1998) The key elements of the Safety Case are 
the following: (Kuo, 1998) 
Hazard identification 
Risk assessment 
Risk reduction 
Emergency preparedness 
Safety management system 
 
In principle, the Safety Case approach can be applied to ships, and in fact there are 
several applications to ships on voluntary basis. Focusing on the individual ship, the 
Safety Case is a comprehensive assessment of the whole system including the 
hardware of the ship, crew and management, with regard to the risk to life, property 
and environment. Therefore the Safety Case can be used by the ship owner to 
assess, control and demonstrate the safety level of their ships, and the company 
itself. 
 
2. Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) 
 
Formal Safety Assessment is introduced by IMO to facilitate the rule-making 
process. “It is a structured and systematic methodology, aiming at enhancing 
maritime safety, including protection of life, health, the marine environment and 
 88
property, by using risk and cost / benefit assessment“ (IMO, 1997). The focus of 
FSA is not the individual ship, it is intended to be applied generically to a group of 
ship, such as a type of ships, all ships, and so on.  FSA comprises five steps: (IMO, 
1997) 
Identification of hazards 
Risk assessment 
Risk control options (regulatory options) 
Cost benefit assessment 
Recommendation for decision-making. 
 
3. The Green Award System 
 
The Green Award certification scheme is developed by the Rotterdam Municipal 
Port Management aiming at improving safety and environmental standards on board 
ships. (Germanischer Lloyd, 1999) This system emphasizes environmental 
protection more than safety. Based on the audit of the ship, crew and management 
with respect to the compliance with national and international requirements, the ship 
is assessed by scoring each item audited. Depending on the total score, the ship will 
be awarded a certificate, which will bring to that ship certain reduction in the normal 
port fee as an incentive for safety and environmental protection. The Green Award 
System is a pure risk indexing system applied to individual ships with respect to the 
compliance of law.   
 
4. The International Marine Safety Rating System (IMSRS) 
 
The IMSRS was developed by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) for the measurement of 
the status of a safety management system, it focuses on the control of loss related 
with life, health, property and environment. Based on management system audit and 
physical condition checks, the safety management system is assessed and scored, 
the sum of points shows the “Level of Excellence” of the safety management system, 
which arranges from level 1 to level 10. This is a Risk Indexing system applied to 
management system concerning loss control, and can be used by insurance 
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companies, P & I Clubs for the evaluation of shipping companies and ships. 
(Germanischer Lloyd, 1999) 
 
5. Inspection targeting system 
 
Inspection targeting system is used by the Administrations to set priority of ships to 
be inspected. The philosophy is that the limited resources should be used to select 
and inspect the ships with highest risk. Each ship is assessed against a set of 
targeting factors, the sum of that will give the targeting value of that vessel, then 
priority can be set according the ranking of targeting values of ships. This is very 
convenient relative ranking system for ships. (Germanischer Lloyd, 1999) 
 
6. Risk-centered-maintenance (RCM) 
 
Traditionally maintenance is based on the recommendation from the manufacture, 
which only consider the failure from the technical perspective, not form the 
perspective of probability of failure and consequence to the whole system 
concerned. Under the theory of Risk-centered-maintenance, maintenance is treated 
as a risk control measure, and is assessed by cost/ benefit analysis in order to 
achieve a balanced maintenance scheme of the whole system. The general 
procedure of Risk-centered-maintenance is as follows: (Child, 1997) 
Identify failure mode 
Analyze likelihood and consequence of failure mode 
Identify the means of maintenance 
Analyze effectiveness of maintenance 
Cost benefit analysis of maintenance 
Implementation of maintenance, verify the effectiveness and improve if 
necessary 
